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I Hear America Suing*:  
Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of 
Electronic Sound 
Charles Cronin** 
Twentieth-century developments in audio recording, copying, and broadcast technologies 
thoroughly altered not only how popular music is distributed and consumed, but also 
how it is created. By the 1960s, sound recording technologies had become so refined, 
ubiquitous, and economically accessible that they—and no longer music notation—had 
become the primary means by which popular songs were created and documented. Audio 
technologies democratized authorship of popular music, but also led to the gradual 
lessening of original primary musical parameters (melody in particular) in many popular 
genres. Paradoxically, despite this general diminishment in original musical expression, 
the number of music infringement claims has grown inexorably, decade by decade, since 
the 1960s. The bases of these claims have also grown remarkably attenuated, often 
involving nothing more than a similar sound or a common word or two shared by two 
songs. 
 
The proliferation of music infringement claims since the 1950s can be attributed to the 
lingering influence of Arnstein v. Porter, a case that established the framework for 
adjudicating copyright infringement cases still used today. Arnstein has fostered ongoing 
judicial diffidence on the essential question of substantial similarity of copyrightable 
expression between the works in dispute, as well as widespread reluctance by courts to 
dismiss claims, or grant defendants summary judgment. This reluctance has led to the 
 
 * First published in 1860, Walt Whitman’s “I Hear America Singing” was a “paean to American 
pluralism and personal industry [that bore] witness to an era before the machinery of the music business 
was first set in motion. By the early twentieth century, ‘talking machines’ were doing much of America’s 
singing . . . .” David Suisman, Selling Sounds: The Commercial Revolution in American Music 8 (2012).  
 ** B.M., Oberlin; J.D., American Univ.; M.A., Ph.D., Stanford; MIMS, Berkeley. Charles Cronin is 
lecturer in law at the University of Southern California, ccronin@law.usc.edu. A sincere and long overdue 
shout out to the late Karen Nelson, who taught me to read music as a child forty years ago while she was a 
student at Yale. 
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development of highly inconsistent case law precedent. In turn, this has provoked 
skittishness in the music industry that has resulted in establishing precautionary measures, 
creating higher barriers to entry. It has also led to the music industry’s resorting to 
financial settlement, even for highly speculative infringement claims which, ultimately, 
engenders more of such claims. 
 
This Article traces developments in sound technology, popular music, and music 
copyright infringement litigation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It argues that 
if courts were more cognizant of the deep changes in the creation and musical content of 
popular songs since the Tin Pan Alley era of the early twentieth century, they might more 
confidently dispose of most music copyright infringement claims today through dismissal 
or summary judgment. 
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Introduction 
In April 2012, Guy Hobbs, a photographer from Cape Town, sued 
Elton John in the United States, claiming copyright infringement of 
Hobbs’s song “Natasha.”1 Shortly after Hobbs had attempted—without 
 
 1. Hobbs v. John, 722 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 2013). Hobbs also named Bernie Taupin and Big Pig 
Music as defendants. Elton John’s eponymous Big Pig Music is a company registered in England. Hobbs 
sued in the United States despite the fact that neither Elton John nor Hobbs is a citizen here; the United 
States offers the seductive possibility of a statutory damage windfall unavailable under English and South 
African copyright law. See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04 (2010) 
(discussing the hapless C. Edward Feltner, Jr., who incurred jury-determined record-breaking statutory 
damages exceeding $31 million for unauthorized broadcasts of syndicated television programs). On more 
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success—in the early 1980s to have “Natasha” published, Elton John and 
his lyricist Bernie Taupin published a recording of their song “Nikita.” 
“Nikita,” like “Natasha,” shared the conceit of a romantic relationship 
thwarted by politically established physical barriers like the Berlin Wall. 
The dispute was reported in the popular press as one between Hobbs 
and Elton John, yet the infringement claim was based entirely on alleged 
similarities between Hobbs’s and Taupin’s lyrics conveying a similar 
romantic quandary.2 By suing Elton John, Hobbs attempted to capitalize 
upon the fact that U.S. copyright law fuses authorship of words and music 
of songs into a single copyrightable work—even if Elton John contributed 
nothing to the lyrics of “Nikita,” as a co-author of the work he could be 
jointly liable for any copyright infringement associated with it.3 
If, rather than publishing his lyrics to “Nikita” in a popular song 
Taupin had published them as a literary work, Hobbs would never have 
claimed infringement of “Natasha.” The fact that the words of “Nikita” 
were published in the same format as “Natasha”—an audio recording of 
a popular song—provoked Hobbs’s claim. No doubt the fact that the legal 
co-author and performer of “Nikita” indulged in flamboyant displays of 
wealth also contributed to Hobbs’s interest in pursuing both defendants. 
Hobbs had the misfortune, however, of pursuing his case in federal 
district court in Illinois shortly after the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s dismissal of a factually similar complaint against the rap performer 
Kanye West by another rapper, Vincent Peters.4 West had access to a 
recording of a song by Peters and in one of his songs used several specific 
verbal references he had heard in that song.5 Peters claimed that while 
these verbal references were not separately protectable, the combination 
of them in his song constituted copyrightable expression.6 The district and 
circuit courts disagreed, and determined that Peters could not monopolize 
references to commonplace names or aphorisms simply by combining 
them. Combinations of the same references in Peters’ and West’s songs 
resulted in “only small cosmetic similarities.”7 In other words, although 
West’s song used verbal references identical to Peters’, these references 
were so literal that they could not be protected alone or combined. 
In the case against Elton John, the purported indications of copying 
included references to striking eyes, impossible love, unfulfilled desire and—
 
limited remedies available under English and South African copyright statutes, see U.N. Educ., Scientific & 
Cultural Org., Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Elton John Confused by Lawsuit 26 Years After Song’s Release, Page Six (Apr. 27, 2012, 
3:58 PM), http://pagesix.com/2012/04/27/elton-john-confused-by-lawsuit-26-years-after-songs-release. This 
Article uses “lyrics” as commonly understood, to mean the words of a popular song. 
 3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 201(a) (2015). 
 4. Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 5. See id. at 631–32.  
 6. See id. at 635. 
 7. Id. at 636. 
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(most telling!) a three-syllable Russian name starting with “N” and ending 
in “A.”8 These shared references were so diffuse that the plaintiff could 
not monopolize them simply by combining them. In short, neither Peters 
nor Hobbs could demonstrate that West or Elton John, respectively, had 
misappropriated original expression by exploiting well-known references. 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s granting of Elton John’s 
motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s claim “flounder[ed] [sic] on 
two well-established principles of copyright law.”9 In the first place, 
copyright does not protect ideas; in the second, it does not protect particular 
expression of those ideas if the expression is indispensible, or even 
commonplace, in the treatment of a given topic.10 
While the claim against Elton John was ultimately disposed of fairly 
and sensibly, it is remarkable that such a claim was brought in the first 
place, and even more so that it metastasized into an appeal requiring the 
attention and resources of the Seventh Circuit. To a greater extent than 
other areas of intellectual property, copyright attracts speculative claimants 
asserting implausible cases of misappropriation. Patent disputes typically 
involve plaintiffs with at least a modicum of scientific or engineering 
acumen, and trademark disputes are typically between commercial 
enterprises.11 With its low threshold of eligibility, copyrightable expression 
can be achieved by anyone. Nevertheless, while many patentable inventions 
and registered trademarks have some monetary value, only a minute 
number of copyrightable works have any economic worth. 
In winner-take-all markets, authors of the infinitesimal corpus of 
financially profitable copyrighted works are alluring and deserving targets 
of infringement claims in the minds of innumerable obscure novelists, 
songwriters, screenwriters, visual artists, and movie makers whose unread, 
unseen, and unappreciated oeuvres never make a cent. Accordingly, the 
greater an author’s fame and earnings, the more likely it is that unknown 
and impecunious authors will seek to siphon some of his12 profits.13 
 
 8. See Hobbs v. John, 722 F.3d 1089, 1094 (7th Cir. 2013). The court noted that while Nikita is a 
masculine name in Slavic countries it is often used as a women’s name in the West. Id. at 1094 n.5. The 
court’s analysis of the lyrics of the two songs, however, oddly presumed that the title of Elton John’s song 
was intended to refer to a desirable woman—highly unlikely, all things considered, but perhaps evidence 
of a bit of clever ambiguity on the part of the songwriters/performer marketing to listeners across hetero- 
and homosexual camps. 
 9. Id. at 1094. Judge Daniel Manion meant “founders” as in fail and sink; not “flounders” as in 
thrash about clumsily. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Practically every dispute mentioned on the homepage of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark 
Office Society on Febuary 10, 2015 involved commercial enterprises, typically pharmaceutical companies. 
See J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y, http://www.jptos.org/index.php (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 12. One commentator notes:  
The rule governing traditional usage is that when “he” denotes the arbitrary person, its 
gender is purely grammatical, not semantic, and hence carries no implications as to the 
referent’s sex. So understood, “he” no more denotes a man because of being masculine, 
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Popular music songwriters and performers are particularly attractive 
butts of such claims. To assert a copyright infringement claim against 
writers Dan Brown or J. K. Rowling, one must have written something at 
least approximating a novel. But writing even a bad novel is challenging 
and time consuming. To lodge a colorable infringement claim against 
Michael Jackson or Elton John, on the other hand, one merely needs to 
have created a three-minute song in a popular idiom, which anyone with 
access to percussion tracks and digital audio recording equipment can 
readily do. Because the creation of music in popular genres like rap, rock, 
techno, and so on requires so little expertise, successful numbers in these 
idioms are more prone to infringement claims than are songs by, for 
instance, Tin Pan Alley relics like Marvin Hamlisch and Stephen Sondheim, 
who created more musically complex works using symbolic notation.14 
Over the past fifty years, there has been an inexorably growing 
number of music copyright infringement claims. Between 1950 and 2000, 
U.S. courts issued more than twice the number of opinions in this area than 
they did between 1900 and 1950.15 And since 2000, courts have already 
issued over half the number of opinions published between 1950 and 2000.16 
These judicial opinions represent only a small portion of music 
copyright infringement claims; most are settled long before trial. While 
settlement—typically a “get lost” payment to the plaintiff—keeps disputes 
off court dockets, it also insidiously promotes spurious or attenuated 
claims by plaintiffs seeking similar payoffs from the music industry based 
on convenience and economic expediency.17 The predilection on the part 
 
than the German ‘die Person’ or the French “la personne” denotes a woman, because of 
being feminine. The alternative practices that are currently recommended as inclusive—
such as saying “he or she” or alternating “he” with “she”—actually threaten to rob the 
language of its capacity for gender-neutral reference to persons. 
Jonathan Lear, Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis 4 n.1 (1999). 
 13. While the plaintiffs in music copyright infringement disputes are typically unknown individuals, the 
names of defendants are commonly well-known songwriters, recording companies, or successful bands. 
See Case List, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Pages/ 
default.html (last visited June 9, 2015). On the other hand, authors and owners of highly profitable works—
like Harry Potter’s J.K. Rowling and Mickey Mouse’s Walt Disney Company—tend to invigilate them 
jealously to discourage anyone they perceive as threatening to draw off any derivative monetary 
potential from their works. See, e.g., John Eligon, Rowling Wins Lawsuit Against Potter Lexicon, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 8, 2008, at B3. 
 14. See The Oxford Handbook of Sondheim Studies (Robert Gordon ed., 2014); Biography, Marvin 
Hamlisch, http://marvinhamlisch.us/biography (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 15. See Case List, supra note 13. 
 16. See id. 
 17. The InPlay segment of the Music Copyright Infringement Resource provides information on a 
number of such fishing expeditions, including those targeting Madonna, Lady Gaga, Coldplay, and others. 
See InPlay, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/default.html 
(last visited June 9, 2015). James Singleton, a federal district judge in Alaska, an uncommon venue for 
copyright claims, let alone one involving music, voiced a refreshingly candid reaction to this phenomenon:  
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of the music industry towards settlement, however, ultimately reflects its 
chariness of the unpredictable results of litigation in this area since the 
peculiar case of Arnstein v. Porter in 1946.18 
In Arnstein—discussed within at greater length—the Second Circuit 
established its durable and influential framework for determining 
copyright infringement, one that has proved to be particularly solicitous 
towards plaintiffs.19 Despite overwhelming evidence that plaintiff Ira 
Arnstein was an emotionally disturbed gadfly whose songs had nothing in 
common with Cole Porter’s, the Second Circuit denied Porter’s request 
for summary judgment.20 The court noted that popular songs are written 
for the delectation of “lay listeners.” Accordingly, the court reasoned, 
judges should avoid granting summary judgment in copyright disputes 
because doing so ultimately results in the court rather than lay listeners 
deciding the essential question: whether there exists substantial similarity 
of protected elements between the plaintiff and defendant’s works.21 
Arnstein was decided in 1946, towards the end of the Tin Pan Alley 
era.22 During the sixty years since then, the creation, distribution, 
consumption, and content of popular music have changed drastically, and 
more so than those of any other medium of expression.23 They have 
changed to such an extent that one can reasonably assert that much of 
what we today consider to be popular music, as that term was understood 
in the 1940s, is actually something else—perhaps “popular sound,” or, 
less charitably, “popular noise.”24 
 
Such actions expend needlessly the efforts of the Court, defending parties and counsel, and 
the numerous resources attached thereto. To the detriment of his clients, the attorney who 
brings such cases to court raises false hopes of success in the litigants and needlessly 
prolongs the aggravation which a lawsuit often foments in its participants. As a fiduciary, it 
is as much the attorney’s responsibility to vigorously represent his clients as it is to counsel 
potential litigants of ill-conceived claims. 
Toliver v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (D. Alaska 2001). 
 18. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 19. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally Gary A. Rosen, Unfair to Genius: The Strange and Litigious Career of Ira 
B. Arnstein (2012). 
 21. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s 
works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners . . . . Surely, then, we have an issue of fact 
which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.”). Other circuits’ frameworks for evaluating copyright 
infringement disputes tend to be variants of the Second Circuit’s, and reflect their diffidence towards 
summary judgment. See Joshua M. Dalton & Sara Cable, The Copyright Defendant’s Guide to Disproving 
Substantial Similarity on Summary Judgment, Landslide, July/Aug. 2011, at 26. 
 22. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 23. “[T]he extraordinarily rapid evolution of the means of musical distribution, rather than put in 
the service of the art itself—in cultural and moral public enrichment—has facilitated the vulgarization 
of a repertoire devoid of aesthetic meaning and directed towards the satisfaction of purely commercial 
appetites.” Michel Gautreau, La Musique et les Musiciens en Droit Privé Français Contemporain 1 
(1970) (author’s translation).  
 24. Popular sound—or noise—might even become a sort of undesirable “utility.” “Imagine a world 
where music flows all around us, like water, or like electricity.” David Kusek & Gerd Leonhard, The 
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If courts were cognizant of how the creation and content of popular 
music today is utterly dissimilar from the composition and content of 
popular music prior to the 1960s, they might feel less inhibited by the long 
shadow of Arnstein’s near prohibition on granting summary judgment in 
music copyright infringement cases. If, moreover, courts recognized that the 
creation and locus of economic value in today’s popular music are entirely 
remote from those of the Tin Pan Alley era of Arnstein, they might more 
confidently dispose of infringement disputes through summary judgment 
and curtail the growing epidemic of extravagantly attenuated claims in 
this area. 
To appreciate how far we have strayed from the early conception of 
copyright as a means to counter wholesale copying of musical works, one 
must trace the evolution of case law in this area before popular music 
became a significant U.S. “industry.” The maturation of this industry 
occurred in the early twentieth century with the technologies of the Tin 
Pan Alley era that led to the establishment of juridical approaches that still 
inform the handling of infringement disputes. 
The balance of the following discussion focuses on how electronic 
technologies in the latter half of the twentieth century have so radically 
altered the creation and content of popular songs that, for the most part, 
the quantum and authorship of copyrightable expression they contain is 
so negligible and diffuse, respectively, as to be incapable of supporting 
infringement claims. Before considering the transformative influence of 
these technologies, let us review copyright protection for musical works 
prior to their arrival. This discussion should illustrate the remarkable 
expansion of copyright protection in this area over a relatively short 
period of time. 
I.  Before the Twentieth Century 
A. Early Statutory Copyright for Musical Works 
While musical works have played a leading role in copyright legislation 
and case law during the past fifty years, they were not protected by statutory 
copyright until late in the eighteenth century.25 In 1777, Johann Christian 
 
Future of Music: Manifesto for the Digital Music Revolution x (2005). This world has existed for 
some time now in the United States. Kusek and Leonhard go on to suggest that the pornography racket 
might provide a good model for the popular music industry in the future. Id. at 72. David Suisman notes 
that the music business has grown so large and has permeated our cultural lives so completely that it is 
everywhere, part of the very air we breathe. David Suisman, Selling Sounds: The Commercial 
Revolution in American Music 8 (2012). “Music may still have cultural or aesthetic value, but neither 
governs its commercial production.” Id. at 9. 
 25. Before enactment of the first copyright statute in England in 1710, particular works of music, and 
even music staff paper, were protected through royal grants to printers. See John Feather, Publishing, 
Piracy and Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain 12 (1994). Beginning in the late 
fifteenth century, similar privileges and patents protected the interests of a number of Continental music 
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Bach sued James Longman, a London music publisher who had published 
an unauthorized version of two of Bach’s sonatas.26 Deciding the dispute 
in Bach’s favor, Lord Mansfield determined that “books and other 
writings” protected under the copyright statute were not limited to works 
of language or letters: “music is a science; it may be written; and the 
mode of conveying the ideas, is by signs and marks.”27 In other words, 
like literary works, musical works are products of human intellection and 
should enjoy the same protection once recorded in symbolic notation. 
Thirteen years after Lord Mansfield determined that the English 
copyright statute protected works of music, the First Congress enacted 
the first U.S. copyright statute.28 While England’s earliest copyright 
statute—the Statute of Anne—simply identified the open-ended category 
“books” as the object of its protection, the U.S. statute protected not only 
books, but more specifically, “maps” and “charts.”29 Plotting the course 
for a wilderness, members of Congress were interested in promoting more 
the creation of land surveys and tide charts than viol da gamba sonatas. 
Given the early U.S. statute’s greater particularity of the scope of 
protectable works, it is not surprising that a revision of the statute—and 
not a judicial interpretation, as in England—brought works of music within 
the scope of U.S. copyright protection. In 1831, Congress passed the first 
comprehensive revision of the copyright statute and specifically included 
musical works among those protected.30 
B. Early Infringement Disputes in England 
Early music copyright infringement cases in England are strikingly 
different from recent disputes in this area in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere: they involved serious rather than popular works, and their 
claims were based upon unauthorized reproductions of the plaintiff’s 
work in toto—not merely alleged musical similarities.31 These differences 
 
printers and publishers. See Joanna Kostylo, Commentary on Ottaviano Petrucci’s Music Printing Patent 
(1498), in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), 
www.copyrighthistory.org. These rights are often identified as monopolies, but “monopoly” implies a 
taking from the commonwealth—that is, acquisition of an exclusive privilege for something the public 
freely enjoyed prior to the grant. In fact, the public typically did not have the right to print and publish 
prior to the award of such privileges. See Bruce Willis Bugbee, The Early American Law of 
Intellectual Property: The Historical Foundations of the United States Patent and Copyright 
Systems 6 (1961). 
 26. Johann Christian Bach was the eleventh child of Johann Sebastian and Anna Magdalena Bach; 
J.S. Bach also fathered seven other children with his first wife Maria—who was also his first cousin. See 
Malcolm Boyd, Bach x (1997). 
 27. Bach v. Longman, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1275 (emphasis added). 
 28. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436. 
 31. See, e.g., Bach, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1274. As is the case today, in the eighteenth century, only popular 
musical works were the subject of copyright infringement disputes. What we would now consider serious 
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underscore the remarkable and—as elaborated within—regrettable change 
over the past two hundred years in proprietary attitudes towards works 
of music.32 
A long-held view of works written by English musicians is akin to 
the reputation of English cuisine: stolid and forgettable.33 Not surprisingly, 
Londoners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a great appetite 
for sparkling new musical works from the Continent, especially operas 
from Italy and France.34 
Despite the fact that sonatas by the Leipzig native Bach established 
copyright for musical works in 1777, for many years after this development, 
publishers in England capitalized upon the ambiguous copyright status of 
works of foreign musicians by issuing unauthorized versions of their 
scores.35 Given the strong demand in England for music by non-English 
authors at the time, these piracies profited English music publishers who 
siphoned purchasers by offering cheaper editions than the legitimate 
original foreign versions. This practice provoked a number of lawsuits by 
authorized publishers, the disposition of which reveals a flagrantly 
protectionist stance by the English judiciary.36 A similar chauvinist approach 
to copyright protection would, in turn, be visited upon English authors 
later in the nineteenth century in response to their attempts to combat 
piracy by American publishers.37 
In the 1824 case Clementi v. Walker, the defendant published, without 
authorization, Friedrich Kalkbrenner’s set of piano variations on the old 
French air, “Vive Henri IV,” which was first published in France.38 
Kalkbrenner sold the right to publish the work in England to Muzio 
 
or classical music, however, was popular then and therefore economically valuable. See infra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
 32. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 33. In 1904, German writer Oskar Schmitz articulated this perception in a treatise setting forth his 
assessment of the inferiority of English music compared with that of other European nations, Germany in 
particular. Oskar Schmitz, Das Land Ohne Musik: Englische Gesellschaftsprobleme (1914). “From 
the very beginning the English have never striven to be a nation of culture” Id. at 42 (author’s translation). 
 34. A dismissive attitude towards English music still holds to some extent; the chances, even today, 
of hearing a performance of German symphonic work or an Italian opera in London are vastly greater 
than those of hearing one of an English symphony or opera in Munich. The likelihood of hearing an English 
opera performed anywhere in Italy is almost nil.  
 35. See Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Bach v. Longman (1777), in Primary Sources on Copyright, 
supra note 25. 
 36. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 37. “Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.” The same chauvinism and intimation of cultural 
insecurity is found in a similar U.S. policy—valid until enactment of the Chace Act of 1891—denying 
copyright protection to the works of foreign authors. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 38. Clementi v. Walker, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 601, 602. Ronan Deazley identifies the air as by 
Kalkbrenner himself. Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Jeffreys v. Boosey (1854), in Primary Sources 
on Copyright, supra note 25. “Vive Henri IV” is, in fact, a popular song dating from the time of France’s 
Henri IV (1555–1610) and the tune has been the basis of many derivative musical works, including a set 
of piano variations by Liszt. See, e.g., Robert Charles Lee, Some Little Known Late Piano Works 
of Liszt 1869–1886: A Miscellany (1970).  
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Clementi, an Italian musician and publisher in London.39 Walker, a 
competitor of Clementi’s, published his unauthorized edition of 
Kalkbrenner’s work based upon the score published in Paris, not Clementi’s 
English edition.40 When Clementi sued Walker for infringement of the 
English publication right that he had bought from Kalkbrenner, the court 
noted that at the time Walker published his unauthorized version, 
Clementi and Kalkbrenner had had only an oral agreement regarding the 
English rights.41 While the court noted the absence of a written assignment, 
this lack was ultimately not dispositive on the question of infringement, 
because the court determined that, given the purpose of the English 
copyright statute to protect only “British interests,” “British enterprise,” 
and “British knowledge,” it was not obligated to extend protection to 
interests based on works of foreigners.42 
The English judiciary maintained this stance towards foreign 
publishers through the middle of the century. Boosey v. Purday, for 
instance, involved another unauthorized English publication of a foreigner’s 
music—in this case, portions of Bellini’s La Sonnambula.43 In 1831, 
Boosey purchased from Bellini’s Italian publisher, Giovanni Ricordi, the 
exclusive right to publish La Sonnambula in England.44 Boosey then 
published a full piano-vocal score, and excerpts thereof, in England, 
shortly after which Purday came out with a competing edition of several 
of the opera’s most popular numbers. Like the earlier Clementi, Boosey 
involved the work of a foreign author. But the latter dispute involved 
two domestic publishers—not an English publisher and a foreign one. 
Nevertheless, the Boosey court followed Clementi in determining that 
only English authors could benefit from rights granted under the Statute 
of Anne; works of foreign authors could not obtain statutory protection 
simply because they were published by an English house.45 This narrow 
reading of the statute not only rendered worthless the publication rights 
Boosey had purchased from Ricordi, but also effectively placed in the 
public domain a vast number of works of foreign composers that 
dominated musical life in London at that time. 
Several years after losing his dispute with Purday, Boosey again 
sued over an unauthorized publication of La Sonnambula, this time by a 
different English music publisher named Jefferys.46 The House of Lords, 
which ultimately considered Boosey’s claim, decided in favor of the 
 
 39. Clementi, 107 Eng. Rep. at 602. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 605. 
 42. See id. at 604. 
 43. Boosey v. Purday, (1849) 154 Eng. Rep. 1159, 1159. 
 44. Id. at 1160. 
 45. Id. at 1163–64. 
 46. Jefferys v. Boosey, (1845) 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (H.L.). 
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defendant.47 Protection under the English copyright statute, the Lords 
determined, could be premised not only upon the nationality of the 
author—the basis of the earlier Purday decision—but also on the place 
of first publication and residency of the author at that time.48 English 
copyright protection could be provided to La Sonnambula only if Bellini 
was residing in England and the opera was first published in England 
during this residency.49 
These shifting interpretations of the application of statutory copyright 
to works of foreign authors precipitated decades of improvisation by 
composers and publishers to meet publication, citizenship, and residency 
requirements in England and elsewhere in search of elusive protection 
beyond composers’ home countries.50 The denial of copyright to foreign 
composers in nineteenth-century English cases—or courts conditioning it 
upon compliance with irksome residency or publication requirements—
appears anomalous today given the now well-established reciprocity of 
protection among developed nations.51 This is especially true given that 
these early claims were based on shameless unauthorized republications 
of entire works, and not the covert appropriation of another’s expression 
for the creation of a purportedly original musical work. Music copyright 
disputes based not on identical copying but on more attenuated musical 
similarities were a byproduct of the twentieth-century American music 
industry. 
C. Early Infringement Disputes in the United States 
The earliest music copyright infringement disputes in Britain 
involved sonatas of Bach and a semiseria opera by Bellini.52 Even the 
earliest U.S. cases, on the other hand, dealt with less rarified works. In 
1845—fourteen years after the United States extended statutory protection 
to music—George Reed, who had published Henry Russell’s popular 
 
 47. Id. at 752. 
 48. See id. at 694–95, 710–11. 
 49. Id. at 749–50. With the decision of Jeffreys v. Boosey, England’s copyright policy towards foreigners 
matched that of the United States at the time. In both countries, protection was provided only to works 
whose author resided in the country in question and first published his work there. For a discussion of the 
impact of Jeffreys v. Boosey on the development of Anglo-American copyright relations, see Deazley, supra 
note 35. 
 50. See generally Jeffery Kallberg, The Chopin Sources: Variants and Versions in Later Manuscripts 
and Printed Editions (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with University 
of Chicago Library) (discussing Chopin’s efforts to obtain copyright protection through simultaneous 
publication of his works in several countries); see also Joel Sachs, Hummel and the Pirates: The Struggle 
for Musical Copyright, 59 Musical Q. 31, 31–33 (1973) (discussing the difficulties faced by Hummel in 
obtaining both domestic and international copyrights for his works under the English, French, and German 
systems). 
 51. See generally Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works: 1886–1986 (1987). 
 52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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song “The Old Arm Chair,” sued the publisher of a competing sheet 
music publication with the same title.53 The words of both songs were 
taken in their entirety, and without authorization, from a poem “The Old 
Arm Chair” written some years earlier by an Englishwoman named 
Elizabeth Cook.54 
Like plaintiffs in early English music copyright infringement cases, 
the plaintiff in Reed v. Carusi claimed that the defendant had infringed 
by republishing his entire work, and not—as would become the norm in 
twentieth-century disputes—merely that the plaintiff had misappropriated 
a portion of his melody.55 Also, while “The Old Arm Chair” was a 
popular work in that it was widely disseminated as sheet music, musically 
it has much in common with operatic works of the same era. This musical 
affinity is unremarkable given that in the early 1800s operas of Rossini, 
Bellini, and other ottocento composers were as much in vogue in America 
as they were in Europe.56 While these bel canto works are now consigned 
exclusively to the realm of highbrow music, they strongly influenced 
popular music in the nineteenth century when low and highbrow genres 
mingled in a promiscuous manner unthinkable today.57 
At trial, presided over by the now much-maligned Justice Roger 
Taney, the defendant claimed that his setting of the public domain poem 
“The Old Arm Chair” was based not upon the music of Russell’s setting 
of the same text, but rather that of “New England,” another song to which 
 
 53. Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431, 432 (C.C.D. Md. 1845). For sound recordings and sheet music 
of both works, see Reed v. Carusi, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/ 
cases/Before1900/Pages/reedcarusi.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 54. See G. Latimer Apperson, The Literary Associations of Wimbledon, 1899 Surrey Mag. 252, 254 
(noting the location at Wimbledon of Cook’s manuscript of the poem “The Old Arm Chair”). 
 55. Reed, 20 F. Cas. at 431. Twenty-three sheet music editions of Russell’s version of “The Old 
Arm Chair” were published in the nineteenth century. See Frank McCormick, George P. Reed v. 
Samuel Carusi: A Nineteenth Century Jury Trial Pursuant to the 1831 Copyright Act 2 (Jan. 10, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1003&context=mlh_pubs. 
 56. Henry Russell studied with Rossini and Bellini before pursuing his career in the United States in 
the 1830s. See Henry Russell, 1812–1900 [biography], Library of Cong., http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/ 
loc.natlib.ihas.200152698/default.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2007). Samuel Carusi also could claim some 
connection to Bellini, having been born around the same time in Catania, Bellini’s native town in Sicily. 
Carusi demonstrated his affinity for the music of his fellow Catanian in his “revised and corrected” English-
language version of the duet “Deh! Con te” from Bellini’s Norma. See Library of Cong., Deh! Con te, 
il prendi = For the Sake of These I Pray [from] Norma [sheet music], Performing Arts Encyclopedia, 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.music.sm1844.400230/default.html (providing images of 
Carusi’s sheet music). 
  Appreciation of Italian opera in America was not limited to the upper crust in cities like New 
York and Boston; it was enormously popular among all economic classes, including prospectors in the 
California Gold Rush. A few of the hastily built opera houses that accommodated this enthusiasm can 
still be found in small California towns. See George Martin, Verdi at the Golden Gate (1993). 
 57. Thanks to numerous recordings—Doc Watson, Everly Brothers, and so on—one work by Russell 
that is somewhat known even today is “My Grandfather’s Clock.” This song, and his excellent “Woodman 
Spare That Tree,” are more lyrical than “The Old Arm Chair” and one hears them occasionally on “good 
music” radio stations on July 4th. 
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the defendant Carusi owned the copyright.58 A comparison of the three 
songs reveals this to be true; Carusi’s lyrical melody in “The Old Arm 
Chair” maps closely to that of his “New England” and has surprisingly little 
in common with the narrowly ranged, and comparatively monotonous, 
melody of Russell’s song.59 
In his opinion, Taney instructed the jury that it could find Carusi 
liable for infringement only if Carusi’s publication “[was] the same with 
that of Russell, in the main design, and in its material and important parts” 
and was not “the effort of his own mind, or taken from an air composed 
by some other person, who was not a plagiarist from that of Russell.”60 
Despite the fact that the music of Carusi’s work was demonstrably 
derived from an earlier work that he owned, the jury found him liable for 
infringement of Reed’s song.61 Taney, who appears not to have scrutinized 
the works in question, accepted the jury’s determination; Carusi was 
enjoined from publishing his work further, and was ordered to pay damages 
of $200. This unjust resolution set a regrettable precedent that would be 
often repeated in music copyright cases in the United States over the 
next 150 years.62 
D. American Pirates of PENZANCE and THE MIKADO 
Most of the operas and a preponderance of other serious works of 
music that were appreciated by Americans from the colonial era until 
well into the twentieth century were written by Europeans and were first 
published in Europe.63 Until Congress passed the International Copyright 
 
 58. The music and words of these works are posted on the Music Copyright Infringement 
Resource page. See Reed v. Carusi, supra note 53. Roger Taney—of Dred Scott v. Sandford notoriety—
was Chief Justice when he presided over Reed v. Carusi, but spent more than half his time on Circuit 
Court cases. See Carl B. Swisher, 5 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney 
Period 1836–64, at 248 (1974). 
 59. The earlier work, “New England” by I.T. Stoddart, was published in 1841, several years before 
Carusi adapted its melody to “The Old Arm Chair.” In 1840, Carusi did publish an arrangement for 
guitar of Russell’s version of “The Old Arm Chair.” See Library of Cong., The Old Arm Chair, Performing 
Arts Encyclopedia, (Sept. 6, 2013), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.music.sm1840.370920/default.html. 
Given that works of music had only recently obtained statutory protection in the United States at that 
time, Carusi capitalized on the ambiguous copyright status for musical arrangements by publishing his 
unauthorized version of Russell’s music. This conduct undoubtedly piqued Russell’s publisher, who 
ultimately sued Carusi for publishing Carusi’s vocal version of “The Old Arm Chair.” See McCormick, 
supra note 55. 
 60. Reed, 20 F. Cas. at 432. 
 61. See id. 
 62. The jury was likely influenced by the fact that Carusi used imagery on the cover of his sheet music—
a spectral woman standing behind a chair—that is nearly identical to that published by Reed. Both images 
are posted on the Music Copyright Infringement Resource case page. See Reed v. Carusi, supra note 53. 
 63. See Larry Starr & Christopher Waterman, American Popular Music: From Minstrelsy to 
MP3, at 10 (2003) (positing that until the middle of the nineteenth century, American popular music was 
“almost entirely European in character”). The Star Spangled Banner, for instance, is an eighteenth-
century English drinking song set to new words by Francis Scott Key. See The Star-Spangled Banner, 
Smithsonian Inst., http://amhistory.si.edu/starspangledbanner (last visited June 9, 2015). 
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Act of 1891, works by Europeans were ineligible for U.S. copyright 
protection unless their authors were living in the United States at the time 
of publication.64 
Not surprisingly, early music copyright infringement disputes in the 
United States involved popular works because the output of Americans—
to the extent Americans were writing music in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—was mainly popular songs. There was little need or 
incentive for domestic creation of new serious music given that, until 
1891, U.S. music publishers could freely plunder a virtually bottomless trove 
of the greatest music ever written. “[T]he ready supply of European music 
made American composition unnecessary . . . . Composers in America have 
earned money writing music only at points where the supply of music from 
the Old World has failed to meet American needs.”65 One consequence 
of this government-condoned piracy between 1831—when U.S. law first 
extended copyright to musical works—and the late nineteenth century, 
was that in the United States, only authors of popular songs might 
anticipate any interest in, and remuneration for, their work.66 
The enactment of the International Copyright Act in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, however, presaged the dawn of the American 
music industry. For the first time, U.S. copyright protection was extended 
to works of foreign authors; a few years later, the Cummings Copyright 
Bill extended performing rights to authors of not only dramatic works, 
but those of musical works as well.67 Both pieces of legislation were the 
culmination of decades of lobbying by foreign authors—most notably 
Charles Dickens—chagrined by their inability to capitalize on the 
increasingly profitable American market.68 
The outre-Atlantique vexation on the part of foreign authors in the 
nineteenth century is nicely illustrated by the litigious antics associated with 
operetta author Arthur Sullivan and his librettist William Gilbert. Gilbert 
and Sullivan’s tuneful operettas have witty original texts in English, and 
 
 64. International Copyright (Chace) Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 65. Richard Crawford, The American Musical Landscape: The Business of Musicianship from 
Billings to Gershwin 58–59 (2000). 
 66. As observed earlier, however, during this time—and even into the early decades of the twentieth 
century—serious and popular musical genres were not the antipodes they would eventually become. 
While there was little financial potential for an opera or symphony by an American composer in the 
nineteenth century, popular songs, like those of Stephen Foster, could be profitable. See supra note 56 
and accompanying text. 
 67. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, 29 Stat. 694. 
 68. See generally Catherine Seville, The Internationalisation of Copyright Law: Books, 
Buccaneers and the Black Flag in the Nineteenth Century (2006). Those opposed to American 
copyright for Dickens and other foreigners argued that if Dickens’ works had been protected in the United 
States, copies would have been much more expensive and Dickens would never have been able to capitalize 
upon widespread popularity among American readers that enabled his profitable speaking tours in the 
United States. See id. at 166. 
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musical scores that are accessible to amateur performers.69 Both 
attributes contributed to the American enthusiasm for these works that 
has been sustained, to some extent, even to the present.70 
Until 1891, U.S. copyright law did not protect works of foreign 
authors unless they were first published in the United States while the 
author was living here.71 In 1879, Gilbert and Sullivan’s copyright assignee 
Richard D’Oyly Carte hoped—in vain—that by not publishing the score 
of Pirates of Penzance, and by holding its “official” premiere in the United 
States, he could prevent unauthorized American productions of this 
dramatic work.72 This gambit did not dissuade American troupes from 
mounting unsanctioned productions of the operetta, although Carte did 
succeed in enjoining several American publishers from publishing 
collections of popular numbers from Penzance.73 
Having failed to prevent unauthorized performances of Penzance in 
America, in 1885 Gilbert and Sullivan concocted an elaborate ruse to 
protect their newest operetta The Mikado. They initially published the 
work in the United States and in England but only as solo piano and 
piano-vocal scores, respectively.74 The solo piano version of The Mikado 
 
 69. See Ian Bradley, Amateur Tenors and Choruses in Public: The Amateur Scene, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Gilbert and Sullivan 177, 177 (David Eden & Meinhard Saremba eds., 2009). Jacques 
Offenbach’s 100 opéras and opéras bouffes from roughly the same time as Gilbert and Sullivan operettas 
were more popular throughout Europe than the Gilbert and Sullivan works. See generally Peter Gammond, 
Offenbach: His Life and Times (1980). Offenbach’s works enjoyed some vogue in the United States but 
never achieved the popularity of those of Gilbert and Sullivan because of two major shortcomings for 
American audiences: the librettos were in French; and Offenbach’s music was relatively more challenging 
for amateur performers than that of Arthur Sullivan.  
 70. “The vocal parts in The Mikado are so easily encompassed, and restricted to such a modest range, 
that big lungs and technical virtuosity are no more prerequisites for their performance than they were for the 
musical comedies of Adam, Hiller, Monsigny, and Gretry.” Richard Silverman, The Operas in Context, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Gilbert and Sullivan, supra note 69, at 69, 70 (quoting music critic Eduard 
Hanslick). 
 71. See Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436, amended by Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 72. The work was first performed in Paignton, England, on December 30, 1879. The first American 
performance was given the following day in New York. See Michael Ainger, Gilbert and Sullivan: A 
Dual Biography 180–81 (2002). Boston music publisher White-Smith had published an unauthorized 
selection of airs from Gilbert and Sullivan’s Pirates of Penzance that had been performed, but not published, 
in England. The Massachusetts Circuit Court determined that this performance did not constitute 
publication of the operetta and enjoined White-Smith from selling their collection of numbers from it. See 
Sullivan v. White, Equity Case No. 1391 (C.C.D. Mass. 1879). White-Smith would, some twenty-eight years 
later, unsuccessfully claim that piano rolls were copies of their sheet music. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. 
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907). The decision was voided by the 1909 Copyright Act that provided authors 
control over mechanical reproductions of their musical works. 
 73. See Zvi Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public 
Performance for Musical Compositions, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1159, 1171 (2007). 
 74. See Carte v. Duff (The Mikado Case), 25 F. 183, 183–84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). Piano-vocal scores 
reduce orchestral scores of a vocal works to versions that can be played at the piano (with standard treble 
and bass staves) but preserve the full complement of vocal parts. Because piano-vocal scores are compact, 
inexpensive, and—most importantly—provide a readily accessible means of learning and rehearsing vocal 
works, they are used almost to the exclusion of orchestral scores by singers and accompanists, and even 
by inexperienced conductors during performances. 
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had been prepared at Gilbert and Sullivan’s behest by an American 
musician named George Tracey who travelled to London to accomplish 
this work.75 Tracey obtained a U.S. copyright for his piano score that was 
published in England and the United States.76 The full orchestral score 
from which Tracey derived his piano version was used for performances 
in London, but not published at that time. 
James Duff, an American impresario, used Tracey’s piano score to 
create an unauthorized orchestral score of The Mikado, prompting Carte 
to sue to prevent Duff from performing his orchestral version.77 The 
Circuit Court, while skeptical of Duff’s ethicality, determined that his 
orchestration did not infringe upon the copyright in Tracey’s piano score, 
and that Duff could perform his version of the operetta as long as he did 
not represent it as the orchestral score of Gilbert and Sullivan.78  
The court determined that Tracey’s piano score was not a “new and 
original work,” but rather simply a “cull[ing]” of “[Sullivan’s] . . . melodies 
and their accompaniments.”79 In other words, the “new and original” 
work was entirely Gilbert and Sullivan’s. Therefore, the publication in 
England of Tracey’s piano score and Gilbert and Sullivan’s piano-vocal 
score constituted an unwitting presentation to the public domain of the 
work’s original musical and dramatic expression. The only U.S. rights 
retained by Gilbert and Sullivan were the copyright and public performance 
right to the operetta as embodied in Sullivan’s orchestration of the work, 
which had not been published anywhere. 
The outcome of The Mikado case may rattle our sense of equity, but 
the court was correct in determining that the solo piano and piano-vocal 
scores are representations of essentially the entire work.80 This finding is 
relevant to investigation of how, over the past century, the qualitative 
and quantitative similarities between musical works upon which one can 
reasonably base a claim of infringement has changed dramatically. 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 184. 
 79. Id. at 185. 
 80. On the significance and use of piano-vocal scores by musicians as essentially complete musical 
works, see supra note 74. Two years before The Mikado Case, a Massachusetts court heard a factually 
similar dispute involving the unauthorized performance of the Redemption Cantata, a religious work by 
Charles Gounod. In Thomas v. Lennon, 14 F. 849 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883), the defendant intended to perform 
the work using an orchestral reconstruction of it that he had devised from a piano-vocal score published in 
England. The court determined that because the author had not published an orchestral version of his work 
in England, he retained the exclusive right to do so despite the fact that his orchestral version had already 
been performed. Id. at 852–53. In other words, because Gounod had not published an orchestral score, 
he retained the right to prevent the public performance of any orchestral score of his work, even though 
the underlying music was in the public domain in the United States because it had been published as a piano-
vocal score in England. 
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Sullivan’s initial version of The Mikado was rendered as a piano-
vocal score, as were the preliminary manifestations of most operatic works 
of the nineteenth century. Composers drafted piano-vocal scores of operas 
first because this medium allows one to capture most of the essential 
information of complex works swiftly and in a manageable visual field—
melody, harmony, rhythm, and text setting. It is only after this vital 
information has been recorded in symbolic notation that a composer will 
turn to the easier task of orchestration. 
Arthur Sullivan’s orchestrations comport with those of other light 
opera composers of his time in that they are clearly predicated upon musical 
information in the underlying piano-vocal score. A skilled musician familiar 
with other works of Sullivan—or for that matter of his contemporaries 
also working in this musical genre—could, therefore, create a full orchestral 
score based upon a piano score that would likely map closely to one 
Sullivan himself would draft.81 
D’Oyly Carte sued over his exclusive right to perform The Mikado 
and not over his right to publish and sell copies of the work.82 The gravamen 
of his dispute reflects a shift in, or at least dispersion of, the locus of 
economic value of musical works by the late nineteenth century. Physical 
copies of musical works were valuable, but increasingly so were public 
performances of them—particularly dramatic works like The Mikado.83 
At issue in The Mikado case was the complete operetta of Gilbert 
and Sullivan, and not merely publication or performance of a derivative 
unauthorized arrangement of one or more of the popular numbers from 
the work.84 In fact, the creation and distribution of such arrangements 
was commonplace and countenanced at the time, but would never be 
tolerated under today’s copyright regime.85 Today’s “maximalist” view of 
copyright for musical works, and its deleterious consequences for successful 
popular musicians, developed alongside the early music industry in New 
York’s Tin Pan Alley early in the twentieth century. 
 
 81. The Mikado Case offers a curious twist to the commonplace compositional practice of the time. 
Despite the fact that Sullivan originally wrote The Mikado as a piano-vocal score, Tracey’s solo piano score 
was derived not from Sullivan’s piano-vocal score but rather Sullivan’s orchestral score. Perhaps Gilbert 
and Sullivan hoped that the skill needed to distill a full score down to its musical essence in a solo piano score 
would satisfy any concerns as to original expression on which Tracey’s copyright claim would depend. If so, 
they hoped in vain. 
 82. Public instrumental concerts of new musical works were typically one-off events in mid-nineteenth 
Europe. New operas, on the other hand, would be performed as often as enthusiasm for the work lasted. 
See F. M. Scherer, Quarter Notes and Bank Notes (2004). 
 83. See The Cambridge History of American Music 162–63 (David Nicholls, ed., 1998) (discussing 
the variety of musical dramatic works in vogue in nineteenth century America). 
 84. See The Mikado Case, 25 F. at 184. 
 85. For example, P. Bucalossi & Arthur Sullivan, The Mikado Quadrille: On Airs from Gilbert and 
Sullivan’s Opera (Chappell & Co. 1885). 
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II.  Tin Pan Alley86 
A. Overview 
After the United States extended copyright protection to works of 
foreigners in 1891, American music publishers could no longer pirate the 
publications of authors overseas with legal impunity.87 Operating under 
this new limitation, publishers in the United States focused increasingly 
on popular works of American rather than European songwriters. In 
fact, these American songwriters were often émigrés from Europe—or 
were trained by European musicians—who were often well-versed in 
serious as well as popular music in Europe at that time.88 
The new emphasis on publishing American rather than European 
songwriters after U.S. copyright was extended to foreign authors in 1891 
opened the possibility to Americans of participating in windfalls from 
sheet music sales to amateurs who played the piano, and sang, at home.89 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century—the early Tin Pan Alley 
era—sheet music publishing was profitable to such an extent that 
successful songwriters established their own publishing firms.90 
In the early 1900s, the piano was only somewhat less ubiquitous a 
household article as the television would—tragically—become in American 
households by the end of the twentieth century.91 It was mostly amateurs, 
and more commonly women than men, who played these instruments.92 
 
 86. “Suggesting the tinny sound of the overworked upright pianos used by song pluggers in publishers’ 
salesrooms, the term is said to have been coined by Monroe H. Rosenfeld, composer of such songs 
as Those Wedding Bells Shall Not Ring Out (1896), Take Back Your Gold (1897) and She Was Happy 
Till She Met You (1899).” H. Wiley Hitchcock, Tin Pan Alley, in Grove Music Online (2013), 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.libproxy.usc.edu/subscriber/article/grove/music/27995. 
 87. See International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 88. Fred Fisher, for instance, founder of one of Tin Pan Alley’s most important publishing houses, 
was born and educated in Germany. See Arthur Iger, Music of the Golden Age, 1900–1950 and Beyond 
7 (1998). 
 89. For example,  
[t]he firms of Thomas B. Harms (established in 1881) and M. Witmark & Sons (1885) published 
only popular songs. Able now to concentrate their attention on a single, highly profitable 
publishing niche, publishers like these developed great efficiencies. . . and as a result, popular 
music became a very big business indeed. Just how big (and how profitable) it remained for the 
1890s to discover.  
See The Cambridge History of American Music, supra note 83, at 183. 
 90. See generally Russell Sanjek & David Sanjek, American Popular Music Business in the 20th 
Century (1988). Among the well-known songwriters who were also publishers are Harry Von Tilzer—
née Aaron Gumbinski—whose most popular number was “Under the Anheuser Bush,” Charles Harris, 
who wrote “After the Ball Is Over”—the most popular song of the early 1890s—and Irving Berlin. 
Nicholas E. Tawa, The Way to Tin Pan Alley: American Popular Song, 1866–1910, at 39 (1990). 
 91. The growth of piano ownership generated an increased demand for sheet music to play on these 
instruments. In 1850, only five percent of American households owned a piano; by 1900 it was twelve 
percent, and by 1923 twenty-three percent. See Scherer, supra note 82, at 156; see also Craig Roell, 
The Piano in America, 1890–1940 (1989). 
 92. Elijah Wald states: 
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Given the limited skill of these players, songs written for their enjoyment 
were necessarily fairly simple, deliberately made so by writers more 
musically accomplished than those purchasing their works.93 
The piano’s popularity contributed, ironically, to two phenomena 
associated with the developing American music industry: popular music 
became more commercially valuable than serious works; and, by catering 
to the limited ability of amateur performers, songwriters abetted the 
division, continually widening since the turn of the twentieth century, 
between the content—and audiences—of serious and popular music.94 
The player piano that became enormously popular in the 1920s, and 
the subsequent development and ultimately universal adoption of sound 
recording and radio broadcasting technologies, were simultaneously 
detrimental and beneficial to music in America.95 On one hand, these 
technologies promoted a decline in musical literacy, the passive and 
uncritical enjoyment of music, and what would develop into the scourge 
of aural pollution in the form of popular music seeping into virtually every 
corner of commercial public space in the United States.96 “The long reach 
of the music business meant not only more music in more places than ever 
before, but also an erosion of silence or opportunity for reflection, for being 
 
Most of the famous composers and concert virtuosos were men, but it is worth noting that, in 
middle- and upper-class homes of the nineteenth century, the majority of musicians were female. 
. . . [A]ny properly brought up young lady was expected to be able to perform on the 
keyboard . . . and a typical evening’s playing might range from Beethoven to “The Old Folks at 
Home.”  
Elijah Wald, How the Beatles Destroyed Rock ’n’ Roll: An Alternative History of American 
Popular Music 19 (2009). By the late nineteenth century, music publishers increasingly emphasized 
the aesthetic appeal of sheet music as an object. “In at least one instance, publishers even tried to increase 
the olfactory appeal by using perfumed paper.” Suisman, supra note 24, at 59. 
 93. David Suisman argues that piano mania in early twentieth century America ultimately fostered 
the development of less demanding popular music:  
The transformation of American musical culture constituted a departure from the disciplined, 
skill-based regime of the piano in the parlor in the nineteenth century. The advent of a novel 
kind of popular music written for the market brought light, catchy songs that were easy to play 
and sing into the rhythms of daily life . . . . 
Id. at 10. 
 94.  German philosopher Theodor Adorno believed that popular and serious music attained a perfect 
balance in Mozart’s The Magic Flute (1791), since which it has not been possible to effectively fuse popular 
and serious musical styles. See Theodor W. Adorno, Essays on Music 290 (Richard Leppert ed., Susan H. 
Gillespie trans., 2002). 
 95. Craig Roell, The Piano in America, 1890–1940, at 57–58 (1989) (“The invention of the 
phonograph and player piano . . . brought the conflict between mechanization and art under greater 
scrutiny, and infused it with a new, more sinister threat. What would happen to the moral value of 
music if the musical experience were trivialized, if it were no longer something to be painstakingly 
cultivated? . . . [I]f music became available to everyone everywhere, would the experience be 
impoverished by the very act of democratizing it?”). 
 96. “Music, any music at all, is so welcome to the weak of mind and so readily supplied by their 
commercial manipulators that almost all the music you hear, at least all you hear inadvertently, is bad.” Paul 
Fussell, BAD: Or, the Dumbing of America 126 (1991). 
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alone, quietly, with one’s own thoughts.”97 On the other hand, they were 
also the impetus for the development of the “golden age” of American 
popular music, roughly between 1920 and 1960.98 
As Americans were entertained increasingly by popular music 
recordings and broadcasts, Tin Pan Alley songwriters tailored their works 
less to the modest abilities of at-home, amateur performers— housewives 
in particular.99 When the commercial value of their songs became generated 
by the consumption of recordings and broadcasts rather than sheet music 
sales, songwriters wrote more musically—and verbally—sophisticated 
works geared towards professional performers.100 This economic shift, 
engendered by electric technologies, allowed George Gershwin, Cole 
Porter, Nathanial Shilkret, and others to fully tap their musical talents to 
produce relatively complex popular works.101 This freedom, in turn, led to 
the development of what is commonly regarded as the only distinguished 
corpus of popular music to date in the United States.102 
The growing diversity of technologies by which to enjoy music: 
pianos, player pianos, and eventually phonorecords, radio broadcasts, 
and movies, also generated unprecedented economic returns for not only 
publishers, broadcasters, and film studios, but also authors and performers 
of popular music.103 Not surprisingly, since the 1920s this surge in economic 
value has been accompanied by a steadily growing number of copyright 
disputes over the authorship of popular—and profitable—songs.104 
 
 97.  Suisman, supra note 24, at 13–14. 
 98. Rosen, supra note 20, at 23 (“If ‘Tin Pan Alley’ denotes an era when music publishers dominated 
the popular music world, and ‘rock and roll’ a time, apparently here to stay, defined by superstar 
performers and integrated big media companies, then the intervening period, when the composers and 
lyricists of the American popular art song reigned, was truly the ‘Age of the Songwriter.’”). 
 99. Immediately prior to the recording era, “‘[o]ur popular song, in its industrial phase, beg[an] 
largely under the influence of women . . . . It [was] women who [sang] songs in the home. It [was] 
women who play[ed] them on the piano.’” Suisman, supra note 24, at 46 (quoting Isaac Goldberg, “one of 
Tin Pan Alley’s shrewdest critics”). 
 100. See Rosen, supra note 20, at 22. “In one form or another, sound was the commodity the music 
industry trafficked in, and as a consequence auditory exposure was inseparable from promotion.” Suisman, 
supra note 24, at 11. 
 101. Irving Berlin had little formal training in music composition but he was a reasonably competent 
pianist and he invariably worked with literate musicians who rendered his melodic ideas into meaningful 
tunes and harmonized them as well. See Alec Wilder, American Popular Song: The Great Innovators 
1900–1950, at 93 (1972). 
 102. See generally Iger, supra note 88. Immigration into the United States at this time by educated 
Jewish musicians has been identified as the wellspring for this musical era. See Rosen, supra note 20, 
at 10; see also Bruce Bawer, The Golden Age of American Song Was the Golden Age of America, Forbes 
(Mar. 24, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/24/the-golden-age-of-american-
song-was-the-golden-age-of-america. 
 103. See Tawa, supra note 90, at 55–81 (discussing the ascendance of the traveling performing musician, 
and various technologies that enabled this development, such as the incandescent light bulb). 
 104. David Suisman observes that, “[w]hat distinguished Tin Pan Alley from other modes of making 
music was that the primary motivation for writing a song was to sell it, not to express some inherently 
human feeling or musical impulse.” Suisman, supra note 24, at 22. 
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Like the earliest English music copyright infringement disputes, the 
handful of American music cases prior to 1900 were based on a defendant’s 
alleged misappropriation of essentially the entire work of the plaintiff. 
This was true not only in Reed v. Carusi, in which the disputed works also 
had identical titles and lyrics, but also in Ferrett v. Atwill and in Jollie v. 
Jacques, which involved competing editions of the same public domain 
folksong.105 Likewise, in Blume v. Spear, the plaintiff claimed that it was 
the defendant’s copying of her melody in toto that infringed upon her 
earlier work.106 Agreeing with the plaintiff in this case, the Circuit Court 
determined: 
The theme or melody of the music is substantially the same in the 
copyrighted and the alleged infringing pieces. . . . When played by a 
competent musician, they appear to be really the same. There are 
variations, but they are so placed as to indicate that the former [plaintiff’s 
song] was taken deliberately, rather than that the latter was a new piece.107 
The broader and swifter dissemination of popular songs in the early 
decades of the twentieth century led to briefer windows of popularity for 
these works.108 It also promoted financial growth of the American music 
industry and a simultaneous increase in the number of plaintiffs eager to 
partake in it through claims of copyright infringement lodged against 
successful industry players. “The rise of music as big business was a 
multinational and transnational phenomenon, but one in which the 
United States had a leading position. . . . The result was that music in 
many ways came to be manufactured, marketed, and purchased like 
other consumer goods.”109 The conditions that enabled the dramatic 
increase in infringement claims in the latter half of the twentieth century 
originated in the Tin Pan Alley era of the first half; the widespread 
distribution of popular songs through sheet music, and eventually audio 
recordings, radio broadcasts, and motion pictures. 
B. Tin Pan Alley: Sheet Music 
An early Tin Pan Alley case, Boosey v. Empire Music,110 dates from 
an era in which the economic value of popular songs was still largely 
generated by sales of sheet music for private performances at home. 
 
 105. See Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Md. 1845); Ferrett v. Atwill, 8 F. Cas. 1161 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 
1846); Jollie v. Jacques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850). Scores and recordings of the disputed works in 
these cases are posted at the Music Copyright Infringement Resource. See Case List, supra note 13. 
 106. Blume v. Spear, 30 F. 629, 629–30 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887). For scores and recordings of the disputed 
works in this case, see Blume v. Spear, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., 
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Before1900/Pages/blumespear.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 107. Blume, 30 F. at 631. 
 108. David Suisman likens Tin Pan Alley’s production of popular songs to that of couturiers or jewelry 
makers “whose goods, in order to be successful, had to be similar to what came before but always a little 
different.” Suisman, supra note 24, at 48. 
 109. Id. at 9. 
 110. 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
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Unlike nineteenth century infringement cases dealing with competing 
publications in the same genre and intended for the same audience, 
Boosey involved the plaintiff’s maudlin ballad “I Hear You Calling Me” 
and the defendant’s upbeat syncopated ragtime number, “Oh Tennessee 
I Hear You Calling Me.”111 The plaintiff’s claim was based on commonalties 
between five words and two measures of music of his song and the 
defendant’s.112 
The court acknowledged that “[t]he two compositions are 
considerably different, both in theme and execution, except as to this 
phrase, ‘I hear you calling me,’ and, as to that, there is a marked 
similarity.”113 The court determined, nevertheless, that the defendant had 
infringed the plaintiff’s work based upon minimal musical and verbal 
similarities of the “hook,” or what the court called the “sentiment” of 
both songs: “The ‘I hear you calling me’ has the kind of sentiment in 
both cases that causes the audiences to listen, applaud, and buy copies in 
the corridor on the way out of the theater.”114 
This is a pioneering decision in that it was the first determination of 
infringement based on qualitatively slight musical similarities between 
the disputed musical works. The court rationalized its holding by 
suggesting that its underlying concern was to protect the economic 
interests of the incipient American music industry: “[T]hese cases must 
be viewed and dealt with from a practical standpoint. Songs of this 
character usually have a temporary vogue, and, if the sale is stopped just 
at the time that the public is keen, serious injury may be done.”115 
Ten years later, in an opinion by Learned Hand, the same court 
based its finding of infringement on a similarly minor musical 
correspondence between two songs. In Fred Fisher v. Dillingham, the 
musical similarities did not involve melody—almost invariably the focus 
of subsequent music copyright disputes—but rather a repeating 
accompaniment figure found in both songs that Hand referred to as an 
ostinato.116 
In vain, the defendant Dillingham claimed that Jerome Kern’s 
“Kalua” did not infringe upon the plaintiff’s “Dardanella” because the 
accompaniment figure in question was commonly found in works that 
 
 111. For scores and recordings of the disputed works in this case, see Boosey v. Empire Music, Univ. S. 
Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1910-1919/Pages/booseyempire.html 
(last visited June 9, 2015). 
 112. See Boosey, 224 F. at 646–47. 
 113. See id. at 647. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). The musical figure in question 
in Fred Fisher does not function as an “ostinato” (that is, an “obstinately” repeating motive), but rather as 
a simple arpeggiated chord accompaniment, the style of which has been used in innumerable popular and 
serious works for over 200 years. 
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preceded those of both parties.117 The court acknowledged that the 
disputed musical material could be found in public domain works. It 
went on to determine, however, that while neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant relied upon those earlier public domain works in creating their 
songs, the defendant did draw upon this material as he had heard it in the 
plaintiff’s song.118 In other words, the court found Kern liable for having 
unconsciously copied the plaintiff’s particular deployment of public 
domain musical material in an attempt to create a similarly affective 
musical number.119 
Hand’s Fred Fisher opinion is predictably brilliant, weaving together 
the author’s original insights and case law precedent. Its conclusion, 
however, is uncharacteristically erroneous. Even if Hand’s inference 
were true—that defendant’s accompaniment style was inspired by 
plaintiff’s earlier use of it—he averts from the fact that musicians have 
used this accompaniment, commonly known as an “Alberti bass,” since 
the early eighteenth century.120 The plaintiff’s use of this accompaniment 
style in a popular song in the twentieth century may have been 
anomalous, but no matter how unusual the circumstances of its 
deployment, this use should not have permitted him to monopolize this 
musical idea applied to a particular musical genre. 
During the forty years following Fred Fisher, music copyright 
infringement cases involved, almost invariably, popular songs in the Tin 
Pan Alley tradition.121 Increasingly, over these forty years, the defending 
works in these cases were songs distributed not only in sheet music, 
phonorecords, and radio broadcasts, but also on soundtracks accompanying 
movies.122 Not surprising given the enormous appetite for Hollywood 
films and the glamorous and lucrative character of this youthful industry, 
its successful players were targets of resentful plaintiffs whose participation 
in the industry was peripheral, or even merely a figment of magical thinking. 
C. Tin Pan Alley: Movies and Recordings 
In 1937, in Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, the plaintiff claimed that a 
song performed in defendant’s movie “Two for Tonight” was based on a 
melody that she had hummed at a Hollywood restaurant in the company 
 
 117. See id. at 148. 
 118. Id. at 149–50. Learned Hand’s reasoning here anticipated his well-known remark in a later 
appellate copyright opinion involving dramatic works: “[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it 
were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, 
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 119.  Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147. Another better-known copyright decision based on unconscious copying 
is Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Alberti Bass, The Oxford Companion to Music (Alison Latham ed., 2002). 
 121. See Case List, supra note 13 (containing the titles of the songs involved in these disputes). 
 122. See id. 
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of a songwriter employed by Paramount.123 Copyright disputes over the 
songs “Play, Fiddle Play,” “Someday My Prince Will Come,” “Drummer 
Boy,” and “Perhaps” also involved works whose popularity—and 
profitability—stemmed from their having been incorporated into feature 
films.124 Royalties from the use of popular songs in radio and television 
broadcast advertisements became a valuable income stream for the music 
industry, as evidenced in copyright disputes over beer commercials in the 
1950s.125 
By the 1930s, popular music had become widely disseminated 
through phonorecordings and radio broadcasts.126 One finds, at this point, 
a new genus of plaintiff among the music publishers and professional 
songwriters that had invariably been the complainants in music copyright 
infringement claims until then. In Arnstein v. Shilkret, Wilkie v. Santly 
Brothers, Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, and Carew v. RKO Radio Pictures, 
the plaintiffs were not established music publishers but rather amateur or 
semi-professional—and typically unpublished—songwriters who had 
seized upon a tantalizing verbal or musical similarity between their work 
and something they may have heard on the radio or at the cinema.127 
The most notorious incarnation of this new category of plaintiff was 
Ira Arnstein. In his legal capers between 1933 and 1946, Arnstein 
pursued the most prominent songwriters of the day, including Irving 
Berlin, Nathanial Shilkret, and Cole Porter, claiming that they had 
 
 123. See Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937). For scores and 
recordings of the disputed works in this case, see Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Univ. S. Cal. Music 
Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1930-1939/Pages/hirschparamount.html (last 
visited June 9, 2015). 
 124. George Cukor used Emery Deutsch’s “Play Fiddle, Play” in his Dinner at Eight (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer 1933). See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936). Snow 
White sings Frank Churchill’s “Someday My Prince Will Come” in Disney’s movie by the same name. 
See Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., 41 F. Supp. 134, 134–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Judy Garland made Roger 
Eden’s “Drummer Boy” popular by performing it in the movie Strike up the Band (Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer 1940). See Jewel Music Pub. Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). Deeana 
Durbin did the same for “Perhaps” in Nice Girl? (Universal Pictures 1941). See Heim v. Universal Pictures, 
Co., 154 F.2d 480, 481 (2d Cir. 1946). For scores, audio recordings, and video clips of the disputed 
works in these cases, see Case List, supra note 13. 
 125. See Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1956) 
(alleging use of plaintiff’s “Whistling Song” in San Francisco Beer Company commercial); Smith v. 
George E. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (challenging use of musical 
idea found in jingle plaintiff had proposed to defendant). For scores and audio recordings of the disputed 
works in these cases, see Case List, supra note 13. 
 126. See William Howland Kenney, Recorded Music in American Life: The Phonograph and 
Popular Memory, 1890–1945, at 182–201 (1999) (discussing widespread popularity of the phonograph 
and recorded music in America during the urbanization of the 1930s). 
 127. See, e.g., Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Hirsch v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1937); Wilkie v. Santly Bros., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 136 
(S.D.N.Y. 1935); Arnstein v. Shilkret, No. 8152 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1933), available at http://mcir.usc.edu/ 
cases/1930-1939/Pages/ArnsteinShilkret.html. Judicial opinions, scores, and audio recordings of the disputed 
works can be found at Case List, supra note 13. 
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infringed upon his melodies in creating popular songs like “Don’t Fence 
Me In” and “Night and Day.”128 Arnstein was mentally disturbed.129 The 
courts were aware of his condition and laced their opinions with 
admonitions—unheeded—to this irritating plaintiff about the potential 
consequences of prosecuting meritless suits.130  
Arnstein obtained his only “win” in 1945 when the Second Circuit 
overturned the summary judgment that had been granted to Cole Porter 
in Arnstein’s case against him.131 The opinion by Judge Jerome Frank 
remains an important copyright decision because it set forth the 
framework that still informs the disposition of infringement claims in the 
Second Circuit and beyond, involving not only music but also all manner 
of expressive works. 
To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work and that this copying involved 
misappropriation of the plaintiff’s protected original expression.132 Arnstein 
qualified this two-step process by establishing that, while professional 
musicians may advise the court on the initial question of copying, only 
the untutored ears of ordinary listeners may decide the ultimate question 
whether such copying amounts to misappropriation of protectable 
musical expression.133 
In his vigorous dissent in Arnstein, Judge Charles Clark argued that 
Judge Frank’s approach was patently backward.134 According to 
Clark, established practice and common sense dictate that expert 
testimony should inform courts on the scope of copyrightable expression 
in the plaintiff’s work and not merely on the preliminary question 
whether the disputed works are substantially similar overall. The 
majority’s decision to leave the question of substantial similarity of 
protected expression to the uninformed ears of jurors was nothing less 
than “so clear an invitation to exploitation of slight musical analogies by 
 
 128. See Case List, supra note 13 (documenting all of the cases brought by Ira Arnstein). 
 129. See generally Rosen, supra note 20. 
 130. See Shilkret, No. 8152 (“[W]hile I have the strongest feeling that the plaintiff ought not to 
continue to make a nuisance of himself, I do believe that he is convinced of the merit of his own 
contention. . . . I would warn the plaintiff, however, who seems rather prone to instigate these 
controversies, that it will be a matter for the Court to consider in the future whether he can be allowed to 
do so upon the mere payment of costs.”). 
 131. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). Writing for the majority in the Second Circuit 
decision, Judge Frank ruled that courts should not grant summary judgment “where there is the slightest 
doubt as to the facts.” Id. at 468 (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 
(2d Cir. 1945)). Clark’s dissent accuses the majority of creating an ad hoc standard for summary judgment 
based upon dicta in Doehler not applicable to the Arnstein dispute. See id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
Under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant summary judgment if “there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 132. See 4 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 1, § 13.01. 
 133. See Porter, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 134. See id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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clever musical tricks in the hope of getting juries hereafter in this circuit 
to divide the wealth of Tin Pan Alley.”135 
The majority’s “anti-intellectual” and “book-burning” decision would, 
in Clark’s view, lead to the “extreme of having all decisions of musical 
plagiarism made by ear, the more unsophisticated and musically naive 
the better.”136 Clark’s monition of “judicial as well as musical [chaos],” 
was grounded in his realization that having uninformed lay listeners decide 
infringement disputes would mean that outcomes of these cases would be 
predicated on aural rather than visual evidence.137 Clark’s comments also 
intimated his presumption that the protectable expression of a work of 
music—and not a particular performance thereof—is most clearly 
rendered in visible scores best analyzed by experts. 
The surge in the number of music infringement claims since Arnstein 
proves Clark’s prescience in asserting that “this holding seems . . . an 
invitation to the strike suit par excellence.”138 The geographical scope of 
the targets of the “strike suits” he anticipated, however, ultimately 
expanded beyond New York’s Tin Pan Alley to include the profitable 
entertainment industries of Hollywood and Nashville. We consider next 
some of these disputes and how they have contributed to the increasingly 
peculiar—and also simply increasing—litigation in this area. 
D. The End of Tin Pan Alley 
The economic underpinnings of the American popular music 
industry in the second half of the twentieth century can be traced to 
recording and radio and television broadcast technologies developed 
earlier in the century. As markets for pianos and sheet music flagged in 
the 1930s and 1940s, those for music recordings—and the radios and 
players on which to hear them—grew swiftly.139 By the late twentieth 
century, popular music was universally enjoyed passively—the fallout of 
significant incremental advances in audio recording and reproducing 
technologies throughout the 1900s. These technologies promoted a change 
from a culture “rooted in the values of production to one rooted in the 
values of consumption.”140 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 478, 480. 
 137. Id. at 480. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Suisman, supra note 24, at 16–17 (“[P]opularity of recordings sent American piano business 
into terminal decline. By the late 1920s, the popularity of player-pianos had faded, and near the end of 
the decade only eighty-one piano manufacturers remained in the United States, down from a peak of nearly 
three hundred in 1909. By 1933 that number dropped to thirty-six.”); see also Kenney, supra note 126, at 
xii (identifying the period between 1890 and 1945 as the era of the phonograph’s rise and decline as the 
dominant medium of popular recorded sound). 
 140. Suisman, supra note 24, at 92. 
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Less immediately obvious—and certainly less recognized—than 
effects of technologies upon distribution and consumption of popular 
music are the effects of sound recording and broadcast technologies on 
its creation and content in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
These technologies played a steadily expanding role in the authorship of 
primary musical elements like melody and harmony as well as secondary 
elements like timbre, volume, tempo, and duration.141 
Digital recording and distribution technologies since the 1980s further 
elevated the importance of these secondary elements—as well as non-
musical attributes of imagery and words—in the economic value of 
recordings of popular music.142 In fact, by the end of the twentieth century, 
works of popular music had become so dependent upon these secondary 
and non-musical elements that more original expression could be found, 
typically, in the visual and audio recordings of a performance of a song 
than in the underlying musical work.143 
III.  After Tin Pan Alley 
A. What Is a Composer? 
“Popular” as a category of American music is largely a twentieth 
century phenomenon. Prior to the establishment of Tin Pan Alley in the 
late nineteenth century, there was, of course, a great deal of music to be 
heard apart from the serious works written and performed by literate 
musicians. Songs associated with labor (such as farming, railroads, and 
canal building) religious hymns, patriotic anthems, military marches, and 
drinking songs were widely enjoyed by all classes.144 
 
 141. With the advent of broadcasting, popular songs “followed an enduring template according to which 
the songs were musically simple, chorus-oriented, and about three minutes in length.” Id. at 277. The 
three-minute standard can be traced to the fact that one side of a 78 rpm disk—on which Tin Pan Alley 
songs were first recorded—could accommodate about three minutes of recorded sound. See Starr & 
Waterman, supra note 63. 
 142. The role of imagery in the marketing and appeal of popular songs grew steadily throughout 
the twentieth century. As early as 1890 “song slides”—projected images relating to the topic of a new 
song—were used to promote sales of sheet music. See Suisman, supra note 24, at 65. 
 143. In their discussion of Blind Lemon Jefferson’s recording of the blues number “Black Snake Moan” 
Larry Starr and Christopher Waterman note: 
The melodic character of the vocal part is restricted to brief, repeated ideas; each of the six 
three-line stanzas is set essentially to the same music, and all the repeated lines of text are set 
to the same repeated music. These features are probably what led H.C. Handy to refer to the 
country blues as “monotonous.” . . . If we listen closely to what Jefferson actually does with his 
seemingly restricted materials, we may come to appreciate an expressive intensity in his work 
that could leave Tin Pan Alley records sounding impoverished by comparison. 
Starr & Waterman, supra note 63, at 105. H.C. Handy’s statement that country blues is monotonous 
music is correct; country blues musical materials are not “seemingly restricted”—they are restricted 
compared to those of other popular genres of the time. 
 144. See generally John A. Lomax & Alan Lomax, American Ballads & Folk Songs (1934) 
(describing the wide range of popular ballads in America during the nineteenth century). 
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Given that these works were mainly transmitted orally, there was 
little demand for published copies of them that could be sold; they had, 
therefore, scant economic value. Accordingly, much popular American 
music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was akin to what we 
now consider folk music in that its authorship and performance were not 
closely associated with a particular individual or time. With diffuse—if 
any—authorial claims, these works were perceived as part of American 
culture, like regional dialects, dress, or cuisines.145 
By the late nineteenth century, the enjoyment of popular music had 
become a more private endeavor. The surge in the number of pianos 
sold, and the home performances that these instruments begot, stoked 
the fledgling market for Tin Pan Alley works. Until music recordings 
supplanted sheet music, these songs posed few musical challenges that 
amateurs could not readily negotiate. The requisite simplicity and formulaic 
nature of these readily playable songs, in turn, made them prone to 
staleness, and this susceptibility fed demand for a steady supply of fresh 
tunes.146 
In the twentieth century, radio—and eventually television—
broadcast technologies and motion pictures influenced the content and 
length of popular music numbers that were created specifically for these 
technologies.147 However, sound recording technologies fundamentally 
changed how popular music was created. Until the 1950s, most mainstream 
American popular music was recorded in scores by literate songwriters 
and not by performers.148 By the 1960s this was no longer true. By then, 
jazz, blues, and hillbilly recordings had been widely disseminated, and 
works in these genres had no tradition of—or need for—notation.149 New 
 
 145. See Michael Broyles, Immigrant, Folk, and Regional Musics in the Nineteenth Century, in The 
Cambridge History of American Music, supra note 83, at 135, 135–57. 
 146. See Rosen, supra note 20, at 10–11. 
 147. Movies and television gradually fostered audience intolerance for musical numbers that 
suspended rapid visual dramatic action that these technologies delivered. Movie audiences today would 
never abide performances of complete musical numbers—of serious numbers, no less—that were 
commonplace in, for example, Marx Brothers movies like Horse Feathers and early television programs 
like The Jack Benny Show. 
 148.  See generally Tawa, supra note 90. On the currency of music notation at that time, consider 
the fact that before Richard Strauss’s Der Rosenkavalier was first performed in New York in 1913, the 
New York Times published a full-page story on the opera with a full recounting of its plot, as well as 
music notation of several of its most significant themes! Richard Strauss Enters the Field of Comic Opera, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1911, at 14. Given the current state of musical literacy, the New York Times, 
America’s “newspaper of record,” would no sooner print music notation today than it would print an 
article in a language other than English. 
 149. Photographs of performances by jazz orchestras and smaller popular music ensembles invariably 
show players performing without scores. See, e.g., Photograph of Louis Jordan and His Timpany Five 
taken in 1946, in Starr & Waterman, supra note 63, at 171. Photographs of performances by orchestras 
in liner notes of a recording of an opera or symphonic work, on the other hand, typically show each 
performer’s eyes fixed upon a music stand bearing part of a score, reflecting the primacy of the musical 
work itself, not individual performers. 
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works in these genres—as well as nascent rock and roll—were typically 
created and recorded by performers improvising upon existing generic 
musical frameworks like the twelve-bar blues chord progression or a 
well-known melody. 
The ability to capture music visually allowed authors to generate 
more sophisticated and original works than otherwise.150 Composition 
through recordings of iterative noodling at an instrument limits the 
musical complexity of the resultant work. This is true because we have a 
greater capacity simultaneously to synthesize visual symbols than aural 
perceptions.151 Over the course of Western civilization, significant works 
of music and poetry have been transmitted orally.152 The overwhelming 
majority of what we consider literary, dramatic, and musical masterpieces, 
however, could only have been created—and transmitted—using visual 
symbols of verbal and musical notation. 
Since time immemorial, popular music, however, has been created 
and transmitted orally. Only between roughly 1850 and 1950—the Tin 
Pan Alley era of the twentieth century in particular—were the majority 
of popular musical works in America created, published, and consumed 
in symbolic notation.153 Not surprisingly, during this period, many American 
popular songs reflected the vocabulary of serious music; Tin Pan Alley 
tunesmiths and music theater composers invariably had some grounding 
in classical music, and many authors of popular songs also wrote serious 
works.154 
Since the development of sound recordings, radio broadcasts and 
motion pictures in the early 1900s, popular music has become vastly more 
profitable than serious music. Musicians hoping to participate in this 
economic boon wrote works appealing to the tastes of a growing audience 
that enjoyed popular music mainly through recorded performances.155 
Sound recordings provided to listeners for the first time the ability 
to replay a professional’s performance of a popular song until it was “in 
 
 150. Even the most preternaturally gifted musicians relied upon visual drafts and notes in creating 
their works. See Douglas Johnson et al., The Beethoven Sketchbooks 3 (Douglas Johnson ed., 1985) 
(discussing how “there are few important composers . . . for whom some [visual] sketches have not 
been found”). 
 151. See John Medina, Brain Rules: 12 Principles for Surviving and Thriving at Work, Home, 
and School 221, 223 (Tracy Cutchlow ed., 2008). 
 152. Perhaps the most famous of these orally-transmitted works is Beowulf, although many believe 
that even this work, dating from the seventh century, was transmitted as a verbal text. See John Miles 
Foley, The Theory of Oral Composition 67 (1991). 
 153. See generally Starr & Waterman, supra note 63. 
 154. Erich Korngold, who wrote the score for the 1938 movie The Adventures of Robin Hood, worked 
with Mahler and Richard Strauss and taught composition at Vienna’s Staatsakademie before emigrating 
from Austria during the Anschluss. Max Steiner, who composed the music for Gone with the Wind, studied 
with Brahms. Richard Rogers studied music at Columbia University and Juilliard. Even the disturbed gadfly 
Ira Arnstein of Arnstein v. Porter obtained a basic musical education at a well-regarded music school in New 
York at the turn of the twentieth century. See Rosen, supra note 20, at 42. 
 155. See generally Starr & Waterman, supra note 63. 
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one’s ear.”156 With such aurally acquired knowledge, and rudimentary 
ability with the guitar—or other instrument that requires minimal 
training to produce some suggestion of musical sound—one can replicate 
the basic musical and verbal elements of these works while performing 
one’s own version of them. 
The technologies that initially expanded the market for these 
musicians’ written compositions, however, ultimately eviscerated it. Sound 
recordings and radio broadcasts also disseminated blues, hillbilly, gospel, 
and other genres of non-notated music that ultimately held greater mass 
appeal than Tin Pan Alley numbers—and certainly more than symphonies 
and operas.157 Crucially important to the question of how sound 
recordings affected copyrightable musical expression is the fact that  
[s]ounds . . . are not part of music, however essential they are to its 
transmission. . . . Sounds, in fact, are not even what musical notation 
specifies . . . . What scores do specify is information about music—
structural components, such as pitches, relative attack-times, [and] 
relative durations.158 
By the end of the twentieth century, most popular songs were 
created and distributed entirely as sound, and the once-vibrant sheet 
music industry had disappeared. Refinements in audio and recording 
technologies had made it possible for musically illiterate or semi-literate 
performers to create and record salable musical numbers—activities limited 
to literate professionals earlier in the century.159 These technologies did 
not elevate thousands of garage musicians into pop stars; the popular 
music market can support only a tiny fraction of them. They did, however, 
profoundly influence the content of American popular music by providing 
the means by which individuals with scant—or no—musical education 
could become simultaneously both the putative authors and performers 
of the bulk of the output of the popular music industry. 
Rock’s electronic instruments are easy to play and accessible to anyone 
who has the wherewithal to buy a used Fender in a pawn shop. . . . The 
rock star who is still learning his chords has nothing to fear in the 
electronic arena, where his producer will turn the sow’s ear of his 
 
 156. See Kenney, supra note 126, at xiii (discussing the effects of repeated exposure to an audio 
recording of a musical work on our perception and recollection of it). 
 157. David Morton, Off the Record: The Technology and Culture of Sound Recording in America 8 
(2002) (“[R]ecording brought high culture music into the capitalist system of production. . . . Sales of 
popular music, not classical music, have been the major source of growth in the industry, so economic 
logic would dictate that recording technology should evolve somehow to suit popular music. However, 
during the formative years of the record industry, it was classical and other forms of highbrow music 
which proved surprisingly influential in fomenting technical change and shaping the practices associated 
with music recording studios.”). 
 158. Benjamin Boretz, Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art from a Musical Point of View, in 
Perspectives on Contemporary Music Theory 31, 34 (Benjamin Boretz & Edward T. Cone eds., 1972). 
 159. See Robert Pattison, The Triumph of Vulgarity: Rock Music in the Mirror of Romanticism 
136 (1987) (listing Duran Duran and Sid Vicious of the Sex Pistols as examples of successful, yet 
musically illiterate performers).  
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strumming into the silk purse of 24-track recording. . . . In live 
performance his lack of skill . . . will redound to his credit. . . . The 
audience will take his incompetence first as a mark of his primitive 
authenticity, second as a mark of his pharmacological heroics, and last 
as a pledge that the most ordinary mortal can rise to stardom.160 
Refinements in audio recording and transmission technologies fostered 
not only a decline in music literacy and the market for popular sheet 
music, but also other developments affecting authorship and the locus of 
economic value in popular music: a trend towards collective authorship; 
the growing significance of input from audio engineers; the importance 
of secondary and non-musical elements like words, imagery, and physical 
attributes of performers; and the sine qua non role of electric power. The 
following discussion examines these developments and their effect on the 
creation of copyrightable musical expression. 
B. The Myth of Romantic Joint Authorship 
The relative importance of music and words in vocal works has been 
debated for centuries.161 Nevertheless, we know Don Giovanni as Mozart’s 
opera (not Lorenzo Da Ponte’s), Porgy & Bess is by George Gershwin 
(not librettist Edwin DuBose Heyward) and “Smoke Gets in Your Eyes” 
is Jerome Kern’s (not wordsmith Otto Harbach’s). The fact that we 
credit Mozart, Gershwin, and Kern as the primary authors of these works 
suggests widespread, if tacit, acknowledgement that their work in the 
relatively recherché idiom of notated music requires more time, talent, 
and expertise than that of librettists working with the written word—
something we all can do to some extent. 
Tin Pan Alley and Broadway show composers collaborated with 
lyricists, but most of their creative work was done alone. For practical 
reasons, a musical score—like a novel or a painting—can be fixed only by 
someone working alone. The relative complexity of these works required 
that they be created and documented by a single musician simultaneously 
juggling many musical parameters. Like hundreds of forgotten songwriters 
who wrote alone at dilapidated pianos in Tin Pan Alley at the turn of the 
twentieth century, Richard Rogers, Marvin Hamlisch, and Stephen 
Sondheim similarly spent untold solitary hours at the end of the 
 
 160. Id. In a recent paean to the pop music duo “MS MR,” Mark Guiducci writes: “How’s this for 
a Girls-era cliché? Two recently graduated Vassar classmates with no formal musical training resolve 
to write hit songs in a Bushwick bedroom with only a MacBook, a keyboard, and good taste in their 
arsenal.” Mark Guiducci, Of a Certain Age, Vogue, May 2013, at 238. 
 161. Mozart famously stated that in opera, poetry must be an “obedient daughter” to music. See 
Hermann Abert, W.A. Mozart 664–65 (1956) (Cliff Eisen ed., Stewart Spencer trans., 2007) (suggesting 
that Mozart’s statement is less a dictate than it is a reaction to dramatically less qualified poets). The question 
of the relative importance of words and music has been a lively issue in opera since its inception and has 
been the topic of operas themselves, such as Antonio Salieri’s Prima la Musica Poi le Parole (1786) and 
Richard Strauss’s Capriccio (1942) (about a competition for supremacy among art, music, and poetry). 
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century—albeit ultimately at well-maintained Steinways in luxurious 
quarters in Beverly Hills and New York’s Upper East Side.162 
In popular music, the longstanding division of authorship between 
composer and librettist dissolved in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.163 The Broadway musical halfheartedly continues this tradition 
of bifurcated authorship, but for the most part the currency of the 
American popular music industry is no longer the output of songwriters 
working in isolation.164 
The authorship of songs in genres like rock, pop, and rap tends to be 
more ambiguous than that of Tin Pan Alley songs, and of musicals 
rooted in this earlier genre. This is because the creation of these works 
does not require documentation in a score—and the reflective isolation 
required to produce one.165 Musically illiterate songwriters necessarily 
depend upon their aural memories to create new songs that, in turn, 
cannot be too complex or lengthy such that they are not readily retained 
within—and repeatedly performed from—the same memory.166 These 
limitations are not merely accommodated by, but actually foster, 
collaborative authorship. 
The popular music industry clings, nevertheless, to the financially 
profitable associations of romantic authorship, promoting new songs with 
images of individual author/performers alone in creative communion 
with a guitar or microphone.167 In fact, the authorship of these works as 
circulated in live performances, and on audio and video recordings, is a 
thoroughly collective effort, with vital contributions to the end product 
from music “arrangers,” sound and lighting engineers, choreographers, 
photographers, and hairdressers. These collaborators are, however, rarely 
 
 162. See generally Meryle Secrest, Stephen Sondheim: A Life (1998). 
 163. See Starr & Waterman, supra note 63, at 225. 
 164. Musicals are increasingly, like pop songs, being “created by committee.” For example, Spiderman: 
Turn Off the Dark, the recent mega-flop, touted music by David Evans and Paul Hewson (“The Edge” 
and “Bono,” respectively). See Ben Brantley, Good vs. Evil, Hanging by a Thread, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 
2011, at C1. 
 165. Salzburg’s Mozarteum has preserved the little cabin (Zauberflötenhäuschen) in which Emanuel 
Schikaneder (impresario and collaborator on The Magic Flute) purportedly imprisoned Mozart to deprive 
him of human contact that might distract him from working alone on the music of the opera. See Andrea 
Roithmayr et al., Funny Facts About the City of Mozart, Visit-Salzburg, http://www.visit-salzburg.net/ 
funfacts.htm (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 166. For the same reason many popular songs today are characterized by “repetition without 
development.” Paul Fussell notes: 
[O]nly outright snobbery could find great differences between the banal repetitiveness of 
Percy Grainger’s Country Gardens and the latest reggae hit, although for insensitive 
overstatement and pure unvarying noise, the reggae would probably win the prize. Both 
depend upon such BAD techniques as repetition without development and a lack of closure 
and thus resemble BAD conversation. 
Fussell, supra note 96, at 125. 
 167. For example, the photograph of Justin Bieber that graces the packaging of his “remix” album. 
See Justin Bieber, My Worlds Acoustic (Universal Music 2010). 
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acknowledged as co-authors; doing so might offer a revealing glimpse 
behind the scenes that would tarnish the creative auras of Justin Bieber, 
Madonna, Beyoncé, Jay Z, and similarly marketable performers. 
The music industry’s perpetuation of the notion of individual 
authorship, through imagery and promotion that fuses song performance 
with creation, has led to an output ostensibly by, and for, youth. Even in 
the heydays of Cole Porter, Irving Berlin, and Jerome Kern, few of the 
millions who knew their songs from recordings were familiar with, or 
cared about, these composers’ physiognomies or voices. The popularity 
of the recordings of the songs written by middle-aged men of nebbish 
appearance was kindled not by performances by the songwriters but 
rather by those with more seductive looks and sounds, like Ethel 
Merman, Bing Crosby, and Ginger Rogers. By the end of the century, 
with the tremendous encroachment of visual baggage, the popular music 
industry had become dominated by songs of photogenic author/performers 
under age forty.168 
IV.  Infringement Disputes in the Age of Electronic Music 
A. Not Feeling Groovy: BRIGHT TUNES V. HARRISONGS 
The copyright implications of collaborative musical authorship were 
raised for the first time in the well-known case Bright Tunes Music 
Corporation v. Harrisongs Music Ltd.169 The publisher of “He’s So Fine”—
a song made popular by a group known as the Chiffons—claimed Beatle 
George Harrison infringed upon “He’s So Fine” in his “My Sweet Lord.”170 
In determining that George Harrison was liable for copyright 
infringement, Judge Richard Owen remarked: “Seeking the wellsprings 
of musical composition—why a composer chooses the succession of notes 
and the harmonies he does—whether it be George Harrison or Richard 
Wagner—is a fascinating inquiry.”171 Owen’s comment is peculiar not 
only because the reason why a composer chooses particular “notes and 
harmonies” is neither particularly interesting, nor even knowable, but 
also because it wrongly implies that George Harrison and Wagner shared 
a common source of choices of “notes and harmonies” with which to work. 
Wagner epitomizes the romantic author, having written 
singlehandedly both the music and verbal texts for his enormously 
 
 168. Exceptional are “acts” like the Rolling Stones or the Eagles that hobble along for decades, or 
reconstitute periodically to capitalize upon—and obliquely flatter—a superannuated fan base’s creaky 
attempts to reconnect temporarily with the 1960s and 70s. 
 169. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For scores 
and recordings of the disputed works in this case, see Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs Music, Univ. S. Cal. 
Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1970-1979/Pages/brightharrisongs.html (last 
visited June 9, 2015).  
 170. Bright Tunes Music, 420 F. Supp. at 178. 
 171. Id. at 180. 
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significant—and simply enormous—works like Tristan und Isolde. 
Wagner’s determination to be solely responsible for the entire authorship of 
his works comports with the megalomaniacal tendencies for which he is 
well known. It was also, however, essential to achieving his goal of an 
aesthetically synthesized Gesamtkunstwerk in which a single author is 
responsible for all elements of an opera—visual, musical, and dramatic.172 
George Harrison, on the other hand, and by his own admission, had 
minimal authorial ambitions when he, his musical cohort, and a complement 
of recording engineers, cobbled together “My Sweet Lord”—the financial 
success of which provoked the copyright owners of “He’s So Fine” to 
seek a portion of its profit.173 Owen’s opinion documents the process by 
which the song was created, which involved little more than Harrison 
jamming with other musicians, riffing on the three-note motif that was 
the primary basis for the infringement claim.174 
Every note and word of Tristan und Isolde—performances of which 
run five hours—can be attributed, through voluminous autograph sketches, 
scores, and correspondence, to Wagner alone.175 The same is not true of 
George Harrison’s three-minute “My Sweet Lord” not only because 
there was never any need for comparable graphical documentation for 
such a musically simple work, but also because Harrison himself described 
the creation of the song as an entirely collaborative effort, the outcome 
of which not even he could parse the authorship.176 
In a footnote to his opinion, Judge Owen made a significant 
observation: “Harrison . . . regards his song as that which he sings at the 
particular moment he is singing it and not something that is written on a 
piece of paper.”177 In other words, George Harrison correctly understood 
that the musical elements of “My Sweet Lord” patched together in a jam 
session were merely the framework for secondary and non-musical 
elements for which he alone would be responsible. These elements would 
largely determine the commercial potential of the song: words, 
performance, and the imagery and fame associated with George Harrison 
and the Beatles. 
If Judge Owen had subscribed to Harrison’s conception of the 
authorship of “My Sweet Lord,” the fact that the contested songs shared 
primary musical elements would have been tempered by the fact that the 
secondary and non-musical elements were utterly dissimilar. By focusing 
entirely on commonalities between rudimentary primary musical elements, 
Judge Owen correctly found substantial similarities between the works. 
 
 172. See Gesamtkunstwerk, 2 The New Grove Dictionary of Opera (Stanley Sadie ed., 1992). 
 173. See Bright Tunes Music, 420 F. Supp. at 179. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See John Deathridge, Public and Private Life: on the Genesis of Tristan und Isolde and the 
Wesendonck Lieder, in Richard Wagner: Tristan und Isolde 19, 22 (Arthur Groos ed., 2011). 
 176. See Bright Tunes Music, 420 F. Supp. at 180. 
 177. Id. at 180 n.9. 
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Confronting uncontroverted evidence of the communal creation of “My 
Sweet Lord” that involved no reference whatever to “He’s So Fine,” 
however, Judge Owen was forced to resort to the extravagant inference 
that Harrison was solely responsible for the primary musical elements of 
“My Sweet Lord” that he unwittingly borrowed from “He’s So Fine.”178 
These elements buried in his unconscious mind somehow became 
Harrison’s inspiration despite the spectacular incongruity between the 
topical and musical affects of the two songs.179 
Since Bright Tunes Music, the late-twentieth century phenomenon 
of communal composition of popular songs has been a recurrent quandary 
in teasing out questions of authorship in music copyright infringement 
cases. Several years after Bright Tunes Music, in Selle v. Gibb, the “disco 
sensation” Bee Gees found themselves in a disagreeable morass similar to 
George Harrison’s when confronted by a plaintiff who had written a song 
with a melody strikingly similar to that of “How Deep Is Your Love.”180 
The Bee Gees song, which had been created after the plaintiff’s, was 
popular and profitable, having been incorporated into the soundtrack of 
the movie Saturday Night Fever.181 
After a trial in which the plaintiff handily established striking 
similarities between the melodies of his song and the Bee Gee’s, the jury 
found the defendants liable for infringement.182 The district court ignored 
the jury’s finding and determined that the Bee Gees could not be liable 
given the extraordinarily attenuated possibility of their access to the 
plaintiff’s work.183 The district court’s determination—affirmed by the 
appeals court—that the jury’s verdict was wrong is highly unusual.184 It 
also suggests that Judge Clark was justified in his dire prognostication in 
his dissent in Arnstein v. Porter, in which he warned of the consequences of 
having “decisions of musical plagiarism made by ear, the more musically 
unsophisticated and musically naïve the better.”185 
The Bee Gees ultimately convinced the court that they had created 
“How Deep Is Your Love” without reference to the plaintiff’s preexisting 
“Let It End” using taped recordings of the group bandying about melodic 
fragments and words to assemble a new song186: “By listening to the tape, 
 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Selle v. Gibb (Selle II), 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 181. For scores, recordings, and video clips of the disputed works, see Case List, supra note 13. 
 182. See Selle v. Gibb (Selle I), 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
 183. See id. at 1183. 
 184. See Serv. Auto Supply Co. of Puerto Rico v. Harte & Co., Inc. 533 F.2d 23, 24–25 (1st Cir. 
1976) (stating that a directed verdict in “favor of the party having the burden of proof is rare,” but allowed 
where that party “has established . . . by testimony that the jury is not at liberty to disbelieve”). The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure use “judgment as a matter of law” rather than “judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. 
 185. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 186. See Selle I, 567 F. Supp. at 1177. 
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one can actually hear the voices of Blue Weaver and Barry Gibb; one is 
admitted into the creative process by which the accused song, according 
to defendants, was composed.”187 
The circumstances surrounding the improvisatory creation by 
performers and sound engineers of “My Sweet Lord,” were remarkably 
similar to those of the Bee Gee’s song “How Deep Is Your Love.” The 
court in the earlier Bright Tunes Music dispute based its opinion on the 
Tin Pan Alley model of a sole musical author, and not the more fluid, 
collaborate authorship subscribed to by the court in Selle. If the Bright 
Tunes Music court had accepted—as I believe it should have—the protean 
and collective authorship asserted by George Harrison, its finding of 
unconscious copying by five or six would have been difficult to justify—
surely someone would have noticed derivation from an earlier hit. 
It was not until nearly twenty-five years after Bright Tunes Music 
that the question of apportioning authorship in popular songs created 
through improvisation was directly addressed in a copyright infringement 
dispute. In BTE v. Bonnecaze, the ousted drummer of the so-called 
alternative band BTE claimed he had contributed to jam sessions in which 
the band’s songs were created and, as a joint author, he was entitled to 
royalties generated by them.188 The court disagreed because “Bonnecaze 
[did not] produce any evidence that any alleged contributions that he 
made to the underlying songs were ever fixed in a tangible form of 
expression.”189 Only if, the court stated, Bonnecaze had produced 
evidence of his participation in the creation of the songs and demonstrated 
that his contributions contained sufficient original expression that they 
could independently obtain copyright protection, might he have qualified 
as a joint author.190 
It is the second requirement—independent copyrightability of 
individual contributions to a jointly created work—that does not mesh 
comfortably with the character of authorship in a vast number of popular 
songs since the 1960s.191 Songs across genres like rock, disco, and rap are 
almost invariably the product of group improvisation on a verbal or 
musical germ like a melodic motif, a rhythmic tattoo, a simple chord 
progression, or a few words. One member of a group—such as Barry 
Gibb for “How Deep Is Your Love”—might initiate the process, but 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. See BTE v. Bonnecaze, 43 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (E.D. La. 1999). 
 189. Id. at 627. 
 190. See id. at 626. 
 191. The Bonnecaze court subscribed to the standard for copyrightability in jointly authored works 
recommended by Professor Paul Goldstein: “In part, Professor Goldstein’s test provides that ‘[a] 
collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work, and a contributor will not obtain a co-ownership 
interest, unless the contribution represents original expression that could stand on its own as the subject 
matter of copyright.’” Id. at 625 (quoting Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 
1994)) (citing Paul Goldstein, 3 Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice § 4.2.1.2 (1989)). 
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once it is underway, the contributions of the players—and audio 
engineers—either coalesce into a unified work or swiftly peter out into 
discarded musical and verbal chaff. This improvisatory and iterative 
approach produces songs in which the contributions of individual 
participants are impossible to separate. Moreover, any concerns—tacit or 
expressed—about attribution during this process would be disruptive, 
and distort its outcome. 
The requirement on which Bonnecaze turned—that each contribution 
to a work of joint authorship be independently copyrightable—is 
particularly problematic when applied to contemporary popular music. 
This is true because, today, none of the authors who jointly create a 
popular song may have contributed individually copyrightable musical 
expression. In Bright Tunes Music, for instance, the only purely musical 
content of “My Sweet Lord” directly attributable to George Harrison 
alone was a three-note descending motive and two chords.192 Most of the 
song as ultimately performed, recorded and marketed, resulted from a 
group of improvising musicians and audio engineers elaborating upon—
and departing from—Harrison’s trivial suggestion. 
Musical works created through collective improvisation—including 
most popular songs from the 1960s forward—are necessarily circumscribed 
by the performing capacities and limitations of the participants. This 
restriction is a repercussion of musical illiteracy. Cole Porter could visually 
record musical expression he was incapable of performing. George 
Harrison—and most songwriter/performers since his time—may have 
imagined musical expression beyond his performance ability but, unable 
to record it himself, he could not claim authorship of it. Lacking access to 
the virtually infinite number of musical “choices” available to literate 
musicians, George Harrison was limited to recording only musical 
expression that he could perform. 
Of course, popular music has never shared the musical range of 
serious idioms. If it had, it would no longer be popular because its 
complexity would alienate the very (large) audience it is intended to 
please. The movement away from symbolic notation toward recorded 
improvisation as means of fixing musical works represents, nevertheless, 
a narrowing of musical “choices” available to popular songwriters. This 
compression of the musical palate, however, has been ameliorated by an 
expansion of the sonic palate available to recording engineers. Increasingly 
sophisticated audio technologies have significantly affected the creation 
and economic value of popular music over the past fifty years, yet the 
authorship and copyright implications of this influence have not been 
closely examined or even recognized. 
 
 192. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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B. Pull the Plug! 
Advances in music technologies have always fostered innovation in 
the composition and performance of musical works. The development of 
the fortepiano allowed Mozart to write concertos that exploited an 
instrument with a greater expressive and pitch range than the baroque 
harpsichord.193 Nineteenth century enhancements to the fortepiano, in 
turn, made possible Liszt’s virtuosic showpieces—performances of which 
on an eighteenth century fortepiano would reduce the earlier instrument 
to kindling.194 The extended tonal gamut and iron frame of pianos of the 
early nineteenth century enabled Liszt to write music containing sustained 
notes and chords that he could not have employed had he been writing 
music for the harpsichord. The same technological developments, of course, 
also enable performers to render the particular sound that Liszt anticipated 
in his music. 
Technological advancements to “acoustic” music instruments have 
enhanced the musical vocabularies of serious composers. Technological 
advancements in electronic technologies, on the other hand, have tended 
to enrich only the sonic vocabularies of popular musicians in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. The widespread adoption of electronic 
recording and the dependence upon synthesized sounds led to not only 
abandonment of symbolic notation, but also a more subtle shift away 
from the preeminence of melody among the basic musical parameters of 
popular songs.195 This shift, in turn, elevated the role of secondary musical 
elements like timbre, along with non-musical elements like lyrics and 
imagery. 
Sonic qualities of volume, pitch, duration, and timbre are as much 
the domain of recording engineers as they are of songwriter/performers 
whose works they massage into marketable products. The significance of 
those manipulating electrical knobs and sliders to the appeal of a live 
performance or recording is obvious when one considers the consequence 
of their absence, along with that of the electricity that powers their mixers, 
amplifiers, and speakers. Like photographers and cosmeticians who truss 
and tweak fashion models to produce the most profitable images, sound 
engineers manipulate the recorded and amplified sounds of voices of 
performers like Madonna, Kanye West, Miley Cyrus, and Justin Timberlake 
to ensure their appeal to mainstream taste.196 Of course, the appeal of the 
vocal renderings of these stars also depends greatly on their physical 
 
 193. See generally Stewart Pollens, The Early Pianoforte (1995) (discussing expanded keyboard 
gamut, and innovations to enhance dynamic variation, in the early pianoforte). 
 194. See, e.g., Franz Liszt, Mephisto Waltzes. 
 195. See infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 196. “When the rocker sells out . . . he becomes the creature of his managers, who haul him about 
the countryside . . . like so much cabbage, displaying him at $15 a ticket to coliseums packed with 
exploited adolescents.” Pattison, supra note 159, at 149. 
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appearance; if Justin Timberlake gained 100 pounds his voice might 
improve, but it is safe to assume that his earnings from recordings of it 
would worsen.197 
An electrical failure during an unamplified performance by a 
performer of Gershwin songs might not even momentarily interrupt the 
concert.198 A power failure at a performance by pop music stars Madonna 
or Kanye West, however, would literally be a showstopper, bringing 
proceedings to a deliciously embarrassing standstill. Without electricity 
to maintain their Potemkin villages of amplified synthetic sound, these 
performances would be piteous. To the extent the gyrating stars’ 
unamplified voices and strumming remain audible and visible prior to 
their fleeing the hellish exposure of an unplugged stage, they would 
sound and look risibly impotent.199 
C. The Sound of (Pop) Music: Infringement Litigation at the End 
of the Twentieth Century 
The shift in the relative importance of primary, secondary, and non-
musical elements in much popular music of recent decades is reflected in 
music copyright infringement disputes during this time. Since the 1970s, 
these disputes have increasingly involved claims of minimal melodic 
similarities, or similarities between secondary musical elements associated 
more with the sound of a particular performance than with an underlying 
musical work.200 This has been a gradual trend, and courts have more 
often than not thwarted plaintiffs’ attempts to capitalize upon minor or 
commonplace musical similarities between their songs and commercially 
successful works of defendants. 
In the 1986 case of Benson v. Coca-Cola, an amateur songwriter 
claimed that the music of the jingle “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” 
infringed his earlier song “Don’t Cha Know.”201 The two works shared 
nothing more than a similar rising four-note opening motive. The Eleventh 
 
 197. The expression “it ain’t over until the fat lady sings” alludes to the general—and mostly accurate—
perception that singers of serious music, and opera in particular, tend towards obesity. When one sees lithe 
performers in an opera production, chances are they will never open their mouths; they are deployed as 
dancers and as supernumeraries who provide visual relief from the singing principals and chorus members. 
 198. It might even prompt one. When Hurricane Sandy shut down New York’s power grid in October 
2012, one pianist soothed her nervous neighbors in their darkened high-rise with an impromptu recital. 
See Brenda Cronin, Pianist Ruth Slenczynska, 89, Shows No Signs of Diminuendo, Wall St. J., Oct. 
31, 2014, at D7. 
 199.  Performances of popular music are typically given in venues larger than those used for serious 
music. Even when popular music is performed in auditoriums like the Metropolitan Opera or Carnegie 
Hall, however, electronic sound amplification—the use of which would be considered disgraceful by 
performers of serious music in these venues—invariably becomes part of the show. 
 200. See Case List, supra note 13. 
 201. See Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974 (11th Cir. 1986). For sound recordings and sheet 
music of both works, see Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., 
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1980-1989/Pages/bensoncocacola.html (last visited June 9, 2015).  
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Circuit affirmed the lower court’s directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant.202 In an attempt to overcome the remote possibility of access 
to his work on the part of Coca-Cola Company, the plaintiff had hoped 
to convince the court that a paltry melodic commonality rendered the 
works strikingly similar. Rejecting his attempt, the court observed that 
popular works—like the numbers here—are musically unsophisticated, 
and that the less musically complex the works in question, the more difficult 
it is to establish striking similarity of protected musical expression between 
them.203 
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in an 
infringement claim against rap performer Mary J. Blige.204 The only 
musical similarity between the disputed works—plaintiff’s “Party Ain’t 
Crunk” and Blige’s “Family Affair”—is a steady percussive beat in 
quadruple meter heard throughout both songs.205 What caught the 
plaintiff’s attention could not have been the fact that the songs shared a 
steady pulsing beat with an emphasis on the downbeat and played at the 
same speed; these characteristics are common to innumerable songs in 
every genre. It was, rather, the fact that both songs used the slang 
“crunk,” and that the sound—timbre, attack, decay—of both rhythm 
tracks is similar.206 
The Sixth Circuit appeals court upheld the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant. Not only was the plaintiff unable to 
prove defendant’s access to his work, but also the defendant solidly 
established her independent creation of the “non-lyrical” portion of 
“Family Affair.”207 Accordingly, the court did not need to consider the 
similarities between the music of the two works and whether any legal 
significance attached to the fact that the independently created rap songs 
shared a similar rhythm track. 
The use of similar rhythm (or “drum” or “percussion”) tracks in 
these works is, in fact, not coincidental because these two tracks contain 
minimal original musical expression. What was somewhat coincidental 
was the musicians’ choice of similar synthesized sounds to be used in the 
performance of an unoriginal repeating steady rhythmic pulse. The choice 
of one sound or another in this context, however, demonstrates hardly 
 
 202. See Benson, 795 F.2d at 975. 
 203. See id. at 975 (citing Selle II, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 204. See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009). For sound recordings of both works, see Jones 
v. Blige, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/ 
jonesblige.html (last visited June 9, 2015).  
 205. See Jones v. Blige, supra note 204. 
 206. “Crunk” is slang referring to either a type of rap music characterized by repeated shouted phrases, 
or an excited person. See Crunk, Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
american_english/crunk (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 207. See Blige, 558 F.3d at 490. 
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more original authorship than does a decision to print a phone directory 
using a particular font, or to paint a wall a certain color. 
Like the Benson and Blige cases, Newton v. Diamond also involved 
an infringement claim based on minimal musical material.208 Jazz flutist 
James Newton had recorded an improvised solo performance that he 
called “Choir.” He assigned his rights in the recording to ECM Records 
but not the ownership of his copyright in the underlying musical work. 
ECM Records licensed a rap group, “Beastie Boys,” to use the first six 
seconds of the recording that the group looped as part of the sonic 
background for their voices in one of their songs.209 Newton claimed that 
the defendants’ use of the sound recording clip infringed upon the music 
copyright to “Choir,” to which he had retained title.210 
Newton’s work, as documented in music notation submitted to the 
Ninth Circuit, comprises two pitches and a few vague performance 
instructions.211 In his recorded performance, Newton plays the first of the 
two pitches and, for several seconds, meanders about them humming and 
modulating the intensity of his blowing over the flute’s blow hole.212 The 
minimal musical information of Newton’s score, in conjunction with 
nebulous performance instructions, conveys virtually no authorial intent.213 
While Newton’s six-second recorded performance contains more 
sound than that evidenced in his score, it does not contain more music.214 
In fact, the only original aspect of the six-second opening of “Choir” is 
the particular sound of Newton’s recorded performance of it. Given the 
score’s paucity of musical information, the sound of performances of 
“Choir” by flutists other than Newton should be somewhat different 
from his. Even if another flutist learned the opening of “Choir” only by 
listening to Newton’s recording, his primary concern would be copying 
Newton’s sound, not his music.215 Accordingly, although Newton registered 
his copyright in “Choir” using his audio recording rather than the sketchy 
 
 208. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003). For sound recordings of both works, 
see Newton v. Diamond, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/ 
2000-2009/Pages/newtondiamond.html (last visited June 9, 2015).  
 209. See Newton, 349 F.3d at 593. 
 210. See id. 
 211. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion includes an image of Newton’s “score.” See id. 
 212. The result sounds like a whirring humming top. See Newton v. Diamond, supra note 208. 
 213.  The expression “senza misura” (“without measure”) instructs the performer to play rhythmically 
freely without being bound to a preordained meter. Newton’s use of “senza misura” on his copyright deposit 
is precious because musicians associate the expression with legitimate music scores that bear no resemblance 
to Newton’s napkin jottings. It also further undermines Newton’s authorial claim as his “senza misura” 
burdens the performer with providing rhythmic authorship to this work. 
 214. See infra Part V for a discussion of the difference between these two terms. 
 215. In fact, given the freedom/burden (“senza misura”) Newton’s score accords the performer, a 
performer who copies Newton’s recorded performance could be said not to be performing Newton’s score. 
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score relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, his having done so did not expand 
the scope of his copyright in a work of music.216 
Finding for the defendant, the district court determined not only 
that the use of the six-second clip was musically de minimis, but also that 
Newton’s score did not contain sufficient original expression in the first 
place to qualify for copyright protection.217 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court, agreeing with its determination that the defendant’s 
copying of the trivial musical information contained within the audio clip 
was de minimis.218 
In evaluating the content of both the audio recording and notation 
of “Choir,” the Ninth Circuit obliquely addressed the ultimate question 
of what constitutes a copyrightable work of music in an age of recorded 
sound.219 Newton, the court suggests, may have created interesting sounds 
in his recorded performance of the opening of “Choir,” but these could 
not be considered part of a copyrighted musical work: 
Whatever copyright interest Newton obtained in this “dense cluster of 
pitches and ambient sounds,” he licensed that interest to ECM Records 
. . . . Thus, regardless of whether the average audience might recognize 
“the Newton technique” at work in the sampled sound recording, those 
performance elements are beyond consideration in Newton’s claim for 
infringement of his copyright in the underlying composition.220 
In other words, while Newton’s recording contains soupçons of improvised 
melody, rhythm, and even harmony, it is essentially a work of sound built 
from elements of duration, pitch, timbre, and volume. Sounds become 
musical only when they are heard within the intelligible structure of a work 
comprised of purely musical elements like melody, harmony, and rhythm. 
An original musical work requires a new “structure of relationships” 
among musical—not sonic—elements; “musical meaning is solely a 
function of context.”221 
It is more difficult to create an original musical “structure of 
relationships” relying more on sounds than on abstract musical elements. 
 
 216. Newton deposited with his copyright registration a cassette recording of his performance—and not 
the scrap of doodling that appears in the published court opinion. See Robert Brauneis, Musical Work 
Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 Tul. 
J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1, 38 n.116 (2014). Although Newton claimed copyright in a musical work, he 
erroneously registered the work as a sound recording. Brauneis raises the question why the Ninth Circuit 
relied on Newton’s score as representing the musical work despite the fact that Newton submitted a 
recording of the work that arguably contains greater musical information than the notation alone. Id. 
 217. See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 218. Id. at 598. 
 219. Id. at 592. 
 220. Id. at 596. 
 221. See Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 
421, 437 (1988). Keyt suggests that courts adjudicating claims of music copyright infringement should 
examine not only the literal similarities between the musical elements of both works, but their semantic 
similarities as well, that is, “the degree to which two compositions resemble each other in effect—the 
response produced in the listener.” Id. at 430. 
H - CRONIN_21 (ONLINE) 6/22/2015 9:50 PM 
1230 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1187 
Nevertheless, this is how popular songs have been created for the past 
fifty years, resulting in an overall contraction of original purely musical 
content and greater musical uniformity. This conformity, in turn, has 
increased the likelihood that two songs will have not only substantially 
similar musical elements, but also similar sounds. 
Given this reality, as reflected in Newton, the outcome of the recent 
dispute involving the hit “Blurred Lines” appears indefensibly regressive. 
In 2013, Marvin Gaye’s publisher and heirs demanded a monetary 
settlement from performers Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke for 
alleged infringement of Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up.”222 When Williams 
and Thicke sought declaratory relief on this allegation, the Gayes 
counterclaimed for copyright infringement, demanding a jury trial.223  
The counterclaimants owned rights only to the underlying music of 
“Got to Give It Up,” and not the sound recording.224 Gaye’s publisher 
had obtained a copyright registration for the song using a version rendered 
in music notation.225 The court, therefore, limited analyses of the disputed 
works as presented during trial to that based upon information about 
them evident from their visual manifestations.226  
The deposit used to register Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up” is more a 
“lead sheet” than “sheet music” in that it provides only minimal 
information intended to be used to render an original performance.227 
Apart from “lyrics,” Gaye’s lead sheet contains virtually no original musical 
expression, and it is immediately apparent upon seeing it that its symbolic 
notation is a transcription by a literate musician of a sound recording of 
quasi-improvised vocalizing involving no more than a handful of pitches.228 
 
 222. See Complaint at 4, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752. For access to audio clips of the works in question, as well as several 
significant filings in this litigation, see Pharrell Williams, et al. v. Bridgeport Music, et al., Univ. S. Cal. Music 
Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Pages/williams.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 223. See Defendants’ Frankie Christian Gaye and Nona Marvisa Gaye Counterclaims, Williams, 
No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013), ECF No. 14, 2013 WL 6079472.  
 224. Id. at 6.  
 225. See Declaration of Donna Stockett, Williams, No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 22, 2014), ECF No. 91-2, 2014 WL 5408782 (including copy of the copyright application and deposit).  
 226. See Minutes of Final Pretrial Conference; Status Conference re: Exhibits; Plaintiffs’ Motions 
In Limine and Defendants’ Motions In Limine, Williams, No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 26, 2015), ECF No. 226. 
 227. A “lead sheet” is “a score, in manuscript or printed form, that shows only the melody, the basic 
harmonic structure, and the lyrics (if any) of a composition.” Robert Witmer, Lead Sheet, in 2 The 
New Grove Dictionary of Jazz 561 (Barry Kernfeld ed., 2d ed. 2002). Today the term “sheet music” 
designates unbound printed music usually of ten or fewer pages. See Sheet Music, in The Grove 
Dictionary of American Music 560 (Barry Kernfeld ed., 2d ed. 2013).  
 228. This is apparent because there is no indication of any preconceived arc or structure to the 
melody. Unoriginal harmonic progressions and an incessant percussive rhythmic underpinning provide 
structure to Gaye’s song. The melodic scraps sung above these elements were inserted haphazardly 
following the words, as reflected in the transcriber’s constant resorting to tie markings to create an 
intelligible visual rendering of music that was never intended to be captured in this manner.  
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The fact that the jury decided in favor of the Gayes, awarding them 
$7.4 million, is arguably a regrettable, but not a surprising, outcome.229 
Both parties presented a great deal of quantitative, and ultimately 
irrelevant, information to the court about the musical similarities and 
dissimilarities of the songs in question.230 Given that the only commonalities 
between the works were non-copyrightable generic musical and sonic 
elements, it appears that the verdict was based mainly on the jurors’ 
opprobrium of the characters and veracity of Robin Thicke and Pharrell 
Williams, as depicted by Gaye’s attorney.231    
D. “Words, Words, Words, I’m so Sick of Words”232 
Once the creation of popular songs no longer required musical 
literacy on the part of their ostensible sole creators, words rather than 
music became the principal element of individual authorship. George 
Gershwin left a voluminous collection of musical scores and sketches in 
his own hand.233 To the extent they exist, holographs of songs by Michael 
Jackson, Bruce Springsteen, and Madonna contain nothing but words.234 
Even the least musically educated songwriter/performer is verbally literate; 
to the extent songwriter/performers—or bands—have abdicated musical 
authorship, they have commonly taken on the verbal authorship once 
handled mainly by lyricists in the Tin Pan Alley era.235 
 
 229. See Ben Sisaro, Both Sides in ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Suit Signal a Continuing Battle, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 18, 2015, at C2. 
 230. Experts from both sides offered exhaustive analyses of the songs, applying classical music 
terminology and sophisticated analytic approaches to works that were created without reference to, or 
knowledge of, either. The effect is almost bathetic, like that one might generate by using the same 
terminology and analytic methods one would apply to an Old Master painting, to the doodling of a 
kindergartner. See, e.g., Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Judith Finell, Williams, No. LA CV13-
06004 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752. 
 231. See Kory Grow, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Lose Multi-Million Dollar ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit, 
Rolling Stone (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/robin-thicke-and-pharrell-lose-
blurred-lines-lawsuit-20150310. Robin Thicke claimed he was drunk and high when he recorded “Blurred 
Lines.” Id. The Gayes’ attorney emphasized to the jury that both Williams and Thicke lied about how 
they created “Blurred Lines.” Jury Hears Closing Arguments in ‘Blurred Lines’ Case, Assoc. Press, Mar. 
5, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/05/us/ap-us-blurred-lines-song-dispute.html.  
 232. My Fair Lady (Warner Bros. 1964). 
 233. Most of these materials are at the George and Ira Gershwin Collection in the Music Division of the 
Library of Congress. See Raymond A. White, The Gershwin Legacy, Library of Cong., http://www.loc.gov/ 
loc/lcib/9809/gershwin.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 234. An image of Michael Jackson’s handwritten lyrics for “Beat It” sold for $60,000 in 2009. See 
$60k Beat It Lyrics Put Jackson in the Autographs Big League, Paul Fraser Collectibles (Nov. 27, 2009), 
http://www.paulfrasercollectibles.com/section.asp?docid=1191&catid=78&n=170110. There is no score for 
Bruce Springsteen’s hit “Born to Run”; his handwritten lyrics, however, were sold recently for nearly 
$200,000. See Allan Kozinn, Springsteen’s Handwritten Lyrics to ‘Born to Run’ Sell for $197,000, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 6, 2013, 11:13 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/springsteens-handwritten-
lyrics-to-born-to-run-sell-for-197000. The only authorial vestige of Madonna Ciccone’s hit “Rain” is her 
jottings of its lyrics. See Lot 175: Madonna Handwritten Lyrics to “Rain”, LiveAuctioneers, 
http://www.liveauctioneers.com/item/428754 (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 235. Literary amateurism in rap and rock songs is essential to their appeal. 
H - CRONIN_21 (ONLINE) 6/22/2015 9:50 PM 
1232 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1187 
The emphasis on the part of songwriter/performers on verbal rather 
than musical authorship is not limited to hip-hop/rap—genres in which 
musical elements of melody and harmony have never been significant. 
This shift in focus is also evident among other popular genres including 
country/western and mainstream pop/rock. A consequence of this shift in 
authorial emphasis—and capacity—in popular music has been a remarkable 
increase in the number of music copyright infringement disputes based as 
much on—if not more—alleged verbal similarities as musical similarities 
between two songs. 
Many of these claims have involved songs with similar titles. In 
Testa v. Janssen, the plaintiff claimed that “Keep on Singing,” made 
popular by singer Helen Reddy, infringed upon the words and music of 
his song “Kept on Singing.”236 Musically, the songs were entirely dissimilar, 
and the evidence offered on the question of access was based on hearsay 
of witnesses who were deceased or refused to aver the proffered evidence.237 
The court decided that defendant’s access to the plaintiff’s work 
could be inferred only if there were striking similarities between the two 
songs.238 The plaintiff’s experts then simply claimed that there were such 
similarities, which prompted the court to deny the defendant’s request 
for summary judgment.239 The title “Kept on Singing” alone is not 
copyrightable, and the question of whether the works could be perceived 
as strikingly similar to support an inference of access, therefore, should 
have been narrowed to whether the plaintiff’s lyrics alone could prevent 
the defendant’s use of the same conceit of an impoverished child 
attaining affluence through singing. 
Since Testa v. Janssen, mainstream pop and country/western stars 
have been confronted with a flurry of increasingly speculative infringement 
claims that invariably devolve to verbal similarities between the titles of two 
songs.240 The same is true of recent claims involving hip-hop/rap numbers, 
 
One of rock’s saddest phenomena is the lyricist who doesn’t understand that his talent for the 
vulgar is incompatible with Romantic poetry in the respectable tradition . . . . The virtues of 
rock can easily become vices when composed for the printed page, where fun, strength, and 
laughter collapse into affectation. 
Pattison, supra note 159, at 208. 
 236. See Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 200 (W.D. Pa. 1980). For sound recordings and sheet music 
of both works, see Testa v. Janssen, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/ 
cases/1980-1989/Pages/testajanssen.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 237. See Testa, 492 F. Supp. at 202. 
 238. See id. at 203. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Between 1997 and 2009, a number of copyright infringement claims involving profitable 
country and western songs and singers were tried and resulted in judicial opinions. In each one of these 
cases—all of which ultimately concluded with grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendants—
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had infringed both their words and music. A cursory comparison, 
however, of the songs at issue in each of the cases, reveals no noticeable musical similarities whatever 
between any of them. Clearly, what provoked the plaintiffs in these disputes was simply the fact that 
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like that involving Kanye West discussed earlier. In Peters v. West, the 
plaintiff was provoked by the fact that his song and West’s hit “Stronger” 
shared not only the same one-word title, but also Nietzsche’s now-
hackneyed—and disproven—aphorism “what doesn’t kill you makes you 
stronger” and a passing reference to fashion model Kate Moss.241 
Peters did not claim that West copied any musical expression. His 
allegation of infringement was based on his belief that verbal similarities 
involving even non-copyrightable ideas were actionable if defendant’s work 
contained several similar references. In other words, his copyright in 
“Stronger” gave him the exclusive right to use a particular collocation of 
verbal references taken from the public domain. The court determined 
that West’s use of the same combination of verbal references found in 
Peters’ song was not infringing. Because the references themselves were 
not protectable expression, Peters could not monopolize his combination 
of their underlying ideas: pretty women, stoicism, and so on.242 
Not surprisingly, infringement claims involving rap songs have been 
based upon verbal similarities, often involving nothing more than a common 
word or two.243 And yet, of the various genres found in music copyright 
infringement cases, rap and hip-hop in general contain arguably the least 
original musical or verbal expression. This is because of the appropriationist 
nature of these genres, in which songs are often assembled from existing 
recorded tracks, and lyrics depend heavily upon literal references: to 
individuals (such as Alec Baldwin, Kate Moss, other rap singers, or the 
performer himself); things (such as loud signals of affluence, including 
Louis Vuitton merchandise and Mercedes-Benz automobiles); and places 
(such as Compton, Miami). “Alec Baldwin” used to evoke the image of a 
(once) attractive man is a crutch that shifts the expressive burden from 
the songwriter to Baldwin.244 
 
the defendants’ works had titles similar to theirs. See Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Lay 
Me Out By the Jukebox When I Die” versus “Prop Me Up Beside the Jukebox (If I Die)”); Brainard 
v. Vassar, 625 F. Supp. 2d 608 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (“Good Ol’ Days to Come” versus “Good Old Days”); 
McKinley v. Raye, No. Civ.A.3:96-CV-2231-P, 1998 WL 119540 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1998) (“I Think 
About You” versus “I Think About You”); McRae v. Smith, 968 F. Supp. 559 (D. Colo. 1997) (“Every 
Minute, Every Hour, Every Day” versus “Every Second”). It is not surprising that country/western stars 
have been the target of such claims given that practitioners of this genre delight in double entendres and 
startling verbal fillips (such as “Heaven’s Just a Sin Away” and “I’d Rather Have a Bottle in Front of 
Me Than a Frontal Lobotomy”). 
 241. See Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2012). The well-known aphorism is from Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer (Duncan Large trans., 
Oxford University Press, 2009) (1888). 
 242. See Peters, 692 F.3d 629 at 636. 
 243. See, e.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009) (slang expression “crunk”); Positive Black Talk 
v. Cash Money Records, 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Back That Ass Up” versus “Back that Azz Up”); 
Complaint, Batts v. Adams, No. CV 10-8123-JFW (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2010) (the word “boom”). 
 244. In a similar vein, Cole Porter used literal reference to great effect in “You’re the Top,” in which the 
Coliseum, the “Louvre Museum,” the Mona Lisa, and so on stand in for original expressions of admiration on 
the part of a besotted and inarticulate swain who begins: “At words poetic, I’m so pathetic.”  
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Although increasingly common, infringement claims based on 
insignificant verbal similarities between rap songs have not been successful. 
Recent decisions involving similarly insignificant musical similarities in 
sound recording sampling claims, however, suggest an uneasy drift towards 
the notion that sounds alone may constitute copyrightable musical and 
verbal expression.245 
E. Free Sample 
Since 1972, the U.S. copyright statute has protected recordings of 
“musical, spoken, or other sounds.”246 Copyright protection for sound 
recordings, however, correlates to the extent to which the recorded 
sounds constitute original expression. The sounds themselves are not 
protected, but rather the recording of a particular rendition of them. An 
audio recording of, for instance, a mechanical “ringing the changes” of a 
cathedral’s bells, should obtain no copyright protection as a musical work, 
and minimal protection as a sound recording.247 The work performed is 
simply an algorithm like that one might apply to a game of tic-tac-toe or 
KenKen. Recording the performance may involve some skill—such as 
adjusting microphones, as a photographer might adjust the angle of his 
lens—but the actual sounds produced and recorded depend entirely 
upon the physical characteristics of the bells and the mechanism striking 
them with no direct human participation.248 
Infringement claims over rap songs based upon musical rather than 
verbal elements do not involve claims of musical similarities per se, but 
rather of illicit “sampling”—that is, use of a portion of an existing sound 
recording in a new number.249 
In popular music, “sampling” typically involves no more than a few 
seconds taken from one of the several sound tracks comprising an existing 
song. The sampled bit may be inserted once or several times within the 
tracks of the new song or, more commonly, “looped”—that is, repeated 
successively as part of the background soundtrack over which original lyrics 
are chanted. It is possible to sample using analog technologies, but vastly 
 
 245. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.  
 247. “Ringing the changes” involves sounding a number of bells in every possible order. The 
greater the number of bells, therefore, the greater the number of possible “changes.” 
 248. If a band of bell ringers rang the changes, the recording would have a modicum more original 
expression stemming from the variations in volume and tempo attributable to the human performance. 
 249. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. “Sampling” refers to the practice, among popular 
musicians in particular, of lifting portions of an existing recording and using this “sample” (usually in a 
repetitive manner) as a component of a new song. The term is related to a more involved technique used 
by music technologists to create a digital record of various parameters of a given sound (such as a 
single pitch sounded on a particular violin) known as a “sample” that can be used in a variety of MIDI 
playback devices. 
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easier to do so with digital audio apparatuses; music sampling is a digital-
era phenomenon. 
Music copyright infringement disputes prior to the digital age 
invariably were grounded upon musical and verbal similarities between 
two songs. Sampling infringement cases, however, also involve similarity—
in fact, identity—between portions of the recorded sound of the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s works.250 The activity, objectives, and results of sampling 
in rap music, however, are fundamentally different from those of copying 
musical expression in other popular genres, particularly from earlier eras. 
Infringers typically attempt to capitalize upon the protected expression 
of another while seeking to camouflage the lifted material to avoid 
detection. The rap sampler’s objective, on the other hand, is typically to 
conjure awareness of a specific earlier work through literal sonic or 
verbal reference—much as verbal references to “Benz” and “Kate Moss” 
invoke a specific automobile or individual—not to capitalize upon another’s 
musical expression. The association may be derogatory—such as snippets 
of the sounds of a winsome ballad placed in a coarse musical and verbal 
context—or complimentary—such as a recording of an evocative sound 
used as part of a larger sonic background over which words are sung.251 
Paradoxically, the more literal one’s copying, whether by sampling 
or imitation, the more likely it may result in a parody and thereby a 
permissible fair use of the existing work.252 When the rap group 2 Live 
Crew invoked the pop ballad “Pretty Woman” for their take-off by the 
same title, it copied not only seminal words and music, but also sounds of 
the recording of Roy Orbison’s performance of his song.253 In Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose, Orbison’s publisher claimed that the group’s unauthorized use 
of verbal and musical portions of “Pretty Woman” infringed its copyright in 
 
 250. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. More ambiguous in terms of copyright protection 
are recordings involving MIDI technology in which a work is mechanically rendered from musical, not 
merely sonic, information contained in a digital file. Digital audio files contain instructions that a digital-
to-analog converter follows to reproduce certain sounds; these sounds convey musical information to 
listeners. MIDI files, on the other hand, contain essentially musical information that synthesizers read 
to produce sound. Michael Boom, Music Through Midi: Using Midi to Create Your Own Electric 
Music System 2 (1987). If I were to create a MIDI file of the musical information contained in a public 
domain music score, and then record a synthesizer’s rendering of this information, these efforts will produce 
little, if any, copyrightable original expression. Like a recording of a mechanized “ringing the changes” of a 
carillon, the underlying work is in the public domain and the recorded sound is determined mainly by 
physical attributes of the instruments producing the sound rather than by expressive direct human 
interaction with these instruments. 
 251. See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 252. This is not true for “mashups” that involve nothing more than combining two or more well-
known recordings of others. Those who believe that their mashups are creative works, in Lee Siegel’s 
view, “[p]ut you in mind of Christopher Lasch’s definition of the clinical narcissist . . . as someone 
‘whose sense of self depends on the validation of others whom he nevertheless degrades.’” Lee Siegel, 
Against the Machine: Being Human in the Age of the Electronic Mob 142 (2008). 
 253. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Campbell II), 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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this song.254 The rap group did not, apparently, sample Orbison’s recording; 
instead, it used synthesized sounds precisely mimicking a segment of it.255 
The Supreme Court ultimately determined that 2 Live Crew did not 
infringe upon Orbison’s song despite the group’s unauthorized use of a 
protected musical work. Such copying, the Court determined, is essential 
to the creation of effective parodies that, in turn, are a desirable form of 
expression in a free society.256 If Campbell had involved a question of 
unauthorized sampling, the disposition of the case would have clarified 
the application of fair use in disputes involving unauthorized use of 
copyrighted sound recordings. In fact, most likely it was because Campbell 
did not involve sampling that the Sixth Circuit issued its provocative opinion 
in a factually somewhat similar dispute a decade later in Bridgeport 
Music v. Dimension Films.257 
In Bridgeport, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had, without 
authorization, incorporated a looped four-second clip from the plaintiff’s 
song, which is by R&B performer George Clinton. The clip contained no 
original music; it was simply a distinctive sound akin to the siren of a 
police car.258 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court endorsed precedent cautioning 
against judicial resort to “bright-line” rules in infringement cases implicating 
the defense of fair use: “The task is not to be simplified with bright-line 
rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case 
analysis.”259 In Bridgeport, on the other hand, the Sixth Circuit relished 
the opportunity of promulgating a bright-line rule applicable to sampling: 
Advances in technology . . . have made instances of digital sampling 
extremely common and have spawned a plethora of copyright 
disputes and litigation. The music industry, as well as the courts, are 
best served if . . . a bright-line test can be established. . . . [O]ne that, at 
least, adds clarity to what constitutes actionable infringement with 
regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted sound recordings. . . . Get 
a license or do not sample.260 
 
 254. See id. at 573. 
 255. “[P]laintiffs have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that any sampling really 
occurred here—and to my untrained ear, at least, it is obvious that most of the 2 Live Crew music was 
not lifted electronically from the 1964 recording.” Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell I), 972 
F.2d 1429, 1444 n.5 (6th Cir. 1992). For sound recordings and sheet music of both works, see Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1990-1999/Pages/ 
campbellacuffrose.html (last visited June 9, 2015). Even had the defendants sampled the Orbison 
recording, this literal copying could not have been the basis of an infringement claim because the 
Orbison recording, created in the 1960s, was not protected by the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which 
provides no retrospective coverage to sound recordings. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).  
 256. See Campbell II, 510 U.S. at 588. 
 257. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 258. See id. at 796. 
 259. See Campbell II, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 260. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798–801. 
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The plaintiff prevailed not because the court found substantial similarity 
between the works in question, but rather because the defendant had 
lifted—and not merely imitated, as did the defendant in Campbell—
portions of the plaintiff’s sound recording.261 The court observed that 
Congress, in legislating copyright protection for music recordings, limited 
sound recording rights vis-à-vis those enjoyed by songwriters and other 
authors.262 Under the copyright statute, owners of sound recordings—
unlike owners of literary, dramatic, and musical works—enjoy only a 
limited performance right, and no authority to prevent others from 
copying their protected expression through independent fixation of even 
slavish imitations of the original recorded performances.263 
Because the statute permits copying, through independent fixation, 
of another’s copyrighted sound recording, the Bridgeport court inferred 
that Congress, in creating this loophole, must have intended that any 
copying of the protected recording itself would constitute infringement.264 
To support this inference, the court focused on the word “entirely” in the 
relevant statutory language limiting the rights provided to sound 
recordings: “[The rights] . . . do not extend to the making or duplication 
of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent 
fixation of other sounds.”265 In other words, the court implied, Congress 
intended to counterbalance the limitation it imposed on the protection of 
sound recordings with an expansion of rights beyond those provided to 
other copyrightable works. Copying even what would otherwise be 
considered a de minimis portion of a protected literary or musical work 
would result in liability in the case of a copyrighted sound recording. 
The Bridgeport decision has been warmly criticized as promoting a 
distorted view of Congress’s intent in legislating limitations on rights 
afforded sound recordings under Section 114 of the Copyright Act.266 The 
House Report relating to the enactment of Section 114 indicates that 
Congress never intended this limitation on rights granted to sound 
recordings to be interpreted as an absolute prohibition against literal 
copying of a portion of a protected sound recording.267 According to the 
report, unauthorized copying of the actual sounds of a protected recording 
constitutes infringement only when one reproduces “all or any substantial 
 
 261. See id. at 802–04. 
 262. Id. at 800. 
 263. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2015).  
 264. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
 265. Id. at 799–800. 
 266. See, e.g., Copyright Law—Sound Recording Act—Sixth Circuit Rejects De Minimis Defense to 
the Infringement of a Sound Recording Copyright, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1355, 1359 (2005) (“The court 
found that the sound recording copyright owner’s right to create a derivative work leads to a strict 
prohibition of sampling, but even a purely textual analysis of the statute proves this interpretation 
misguided.”). 
 267. Id. at 1360. 
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portion of the actual sounds.”268 Accordingly, infringement claims involving 
portions of copyrighted sound recordings should be adjudicated using the 
same “substantial similarity” standard as are cases dealing with other 
copyrightable expression like literary and musical works. 
While sampling involves identity—and not mere similarity—of the 
expression at issue, the use of such identical protected expression from 
an existing sound recording does not necessarily constitute substantial 
similarity. In fact, the quantum of similar expression to support an 
infringement claim in sampling disputes should, arguably, be greater than 
it is in claims involving musical works. This is because the economic 
worth of sound recordings—unlike that of the recorded music itself—is 
based upon the combined values of the underlying work, and that of a 
particular performance of it. This is true of recordings of both serious 
and popular music, although the economic value of recordings of popular 
vocal music depends upon particular performers to an even greater extent 
than do serious instrumental works.269 
* * * 
The greatest influence on the evolution of American popular music 
since the middle of the twentieth century has not been social or cultural 
developments but rather electric power. Universal and reliable access to 
ample and inexpensive electricity in the United States has made it 
possible for anyone to create musical works using recording technology, 
perform them using electrical amplification, manipulate these recordings 
using mixers and synthesizers, and easily appropriate (“sample”) recorded 
sound. 
The democratizing influence of electricity, however, also engendered 
a recalibration of the musical, sonic, verbal, and visual components of 
popular songs. With the decline of purely musical elements, and ascendency 
of sonic, verbal, and visual components, the rift between serious and 
popular music has never been wider. This democratization also has 
contributed to the remarkable increase in music infringement disputes in 
recent decades. 
The fact that the means of creation and the musical content of 
popular music have changed dramatically over the past fifty years should 
not affect the disposition of copyright infringement disputes involving 
 
 268. See id. 
 269. Pianist Evgeny Kissin’s recording of a public domain work by Chopin, for instance, will have 
greater economic value than his recording of a contemporary copyrighted composition. This is because 
the former, but not the latter, offers an ideal combination of an expressive work and a particular 
performer of it. While Kissin’s recording of a Chopin sonata is more valuable than that of a less 
preternaturally gifted pianist a recording of his unembellished sung or played performance of “Happy 
Birthday” is not. Marilyn Monroe’s recorded performance of her singing “Happy Birthday,” on the 
other hand, is more valuable than Kissin’s, despite the fact that Monroe could barely carry a tune. 
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these works. Regardless of whether the claim involves words, music, or 
sampled recorded sounds, a plaintiff must still establish that the defendant 
misappropriated more than a de minimis portion of his copyrightable 
expression.270 
Music infringement cases from the early twentieth century were 
typically based on claims of misappropriation of a song in its entirety.271 
By the end of the century, plaintiffs began attempting to monopolize 
distinctive sounds, performance styles, rhythmic tattoos, and even a 
single word in popular songs.272 This spate of speculative claims belies a 
widespread perception of broader authorial entitlement than legislators 
ever intended copyright to provide. How might courts help reverse this 
litigious trend and the overreaching ethos it suggests and thereby foster a 
better understanding on the part of the popular music industry of the 
advantages of providing minimal copyright protection to works of popular 
music? 
V.  What Went Wrong? 
A. ARNSTEIN’s Legacy 
The U.S. Copyright Statute of 1790 ran about two pages and 
provided copyright protection to maps, charts, and books.273 The elegant 
Copyright Act of 1909 was ten times as long, accommodating new 
technologies like piano rolls.274 The current U.S. Copyright Act is more 
than fifteen times as long as the 1909 Act—the result of the inexorably 
expanding scope of protection covering innovations like semiconductors 
and digital audio recorders. The term of protection also has continued to 
lengthen from twenty-eight years in 1790 to at least seventy today.275 
The number of music infringement disputes has grown in tandem 
with the scope and term of copyright protection. This growth can partly 
be attributed to the gradual expansion of rights to works derived from 
protected expression.276 The current copyright statute provides authors 
rights to derivative works, but defines this category very broadly.277 It has 
 
 270. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 271. See Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956) (“My God and I”); Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 
(C.C.D. Md. 1845) (“The Old Arm Chair”); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 
1936) (“O Gladsome Light”); Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914) (“Never Turn Back”). An 
exception is Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942), in which the only similarity 
between the contested works was the common title “Chatterbox.” The case was dismissed. 
 272. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 273. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 274. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. 
 275. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1330 (2015). 
 276. See Kindra Deneau, The Historical Development and Misplaced Justification for the Derivative 
Work Right, 19 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 68 (2013). 
 277. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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been left to courts to determine whether a specific work is derivative, 
and what constitutes illicit copying of it. 
Statutory provision of copyright to derivative works, like the ever-
lengthening term of copyright protection, reflects the development of 
media technologies that enabled the swift and economical distribution of 
expressive works in an expanding number of genres. A popular song in 
1850 might have been gradually disseminated orally and perhaps through 
limited sheet music publication. In 2015, one has the capacity to circulate 
throughout the world a work in its original form, as a country/western 
number, an R&B version, and as a jazz improvisation, through live and 
recorded performances, as sound recordings, radio and television ads, 
movies, television shows, ring tones, YouTube, and other Internet social 
media.278 Also contributing to the growth of infringement claims is the 
fact that while the statute specifies civil and criminal remedies for illicit 
copying, it does not establish an author’s right to curtail the creation and 
distribution of works that are similar, substantially similar, or even strikingly 
similar, to theirs.279 This right has been devised by federal courts over the 
past century. 
Judicial accommodation of music claims can be traced to the lingering 
influence of Arnstein, a case that entirely ceded to lay listeners the ultimate 
question whether there is substantial similarity between the protected 
elements of the works in dispute.280 Moreover, in promulgating this 
approach in 1946, the Second Circuit established an extraordinarily high 
threshold for summary judgment—of “not the slightest doubt” as to 
relevant facts.281 
Subsequent cases have moderated Arnstein’s daunting threshold to 
that now promulgated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.”282 Despite the emergence of this 
less rigorous standard, courts have been surprisingly reticent to grant 
summary judgment in copyright infringement disputes because of the 
common perception that determining similarities between two expressive 
works involves an “extremely close question of fact.”283 
 
 278. Some popular music genres—rock, hip-hop/rap, disco, techno—however, are not tractable to 
the creation of derivative works across genres. Unlike Christmas carols, for instance, whose thoroughly 
melodic orientation—and public domain status—renders them ideal fodder for commercial exploitation, 
the exploitation of a rock or rap number is mostly limited to a particular rendition—or one that slavishly 
imitates the sound of it.  
 279. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 280. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 282. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 283. “Summary judgment is often disfavored in copyright cases, for courts are generally reluctant to 
make subjective comparisons and determinations.” Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(citing Porter, 154 F.2d 464); see also Dalton & Cable, supra note 21, at 26. 
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Between 1960 and 2010, over forty music copyright infringement 
cases turned on summary judgment motions.284 Almost invariably, the 
defendant sought summary judgment at the district court; in several 
instances, appeal courts overturned the district court’s granting of 
defendant’s motion.285 In sixteen of forty-two cases, the courts denied 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment.286 
The 1965 case Nordstrom v. R.C.A. illustrates the potential for 
inaccurate outcomes resulting from courts’ hesitancy to provide summary 
judgment in music infringement disputes.287 Frank Nordstrom, a pro se 
plaintiff, claimed that Jerry Herman, well-known author of Broadway 
shows, such as Hello Dolly, had copied his song “Shalom” in a number 
by the same title for Herman’s musical Milk and Honey. Nordstrom had 
submitted his unpublished song to R.C.A., which ultimately released an 
“original cast” recording of Milk and Honey, to be considered for 
recording, but Herman was out of the country for all but three of the 
days in which a notated copy of the song was in the R.C.A. office. R.C.A. 
testified that given established company practices, the only possible 
means by which Herman could have been exposed to the plaintiff’s song 
would have been through the extraordinary coincidence of his hearing, 
on one of the three days in which he was in the U.S. at that time, a live 
audition of it at their studios—an event that never occurred. 
Judge Alfred Arraj’s opinion stated that the “defendant admitt[ed] 
that there is a high degree of similarity between the two compositions.”288 
This is a perplexing statement given that the two songs are strikingly 
different in their musical particulars as well as in overall affect.289 The 
songs are in different keys but, much more significantly, are in different 
 
 284. See Case List, supra note 13, (listing all cases between 1960–2010, providing relevant judicial 
opinions and commentary on the disposition of each case). 
 285. See, e.g., Glover v. Austin, 289 Fed. App’x 430 (2d Cir. 2008); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 
(9th Cir. 2004); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
 286. See Case List, supra note 13. 
 287. Nordstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 251 F. Supp. 41 (D. Colo. 1965). For sound recordings and 
sheet music of both works, see Nordstrom v. R.C.A., Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement 
Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1960-1969/Pages/nordstromrca.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 288. Nordstrom, 251 F. Supp. at 42.  
 289. Id. The court went on to say that it “assume[d] that they are nearly identical even to the 
extent of the accused composition duplicating plaintiff’s error in introducing eight bars of new material, 
from the twenty-fifth to the thirty-second bars of his song, rather than only four bars needed to complete 
the correct metric structure.” Id. In other words, the court appears to have subscribed to the remarkable 
suggestion by the plaintiff that the music of defendant’s number infringed his song not because it contains 
even a passing melodic resemblance to it, but rather because defendant’s work has the same overall 
structure, and, specifically, because defendant’s number, like the plaintiff’s, uses a structure of forty 
rather than thirty-six measures. Documentation available on the Nordstrom case page of the Music 
Copyright Infringement Resource presents the measures of the defendant’s work that plaintiff considered 
suspicious. See Nordstrom v. R.C.A., supra note 287. These were derived from the plaintiff’s exhibit 
comparing the two works, and not from the published piano-vocal score of the defendant’s work in which 
they do not appear. 
H - CRONIN_21 (ONLINE) 6/22/2015 9:50 PM 
1242 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1187 
modes. Herman’s minor key and limited melodic range conveys a more 
serious affect than the major key of Nordstrom’s more melodically 
expansive and cheerful number. The lyrics of both songs dwell on the 
title word “shalom”—perhaps the most commonly known Hebrew word 
among Anglophones, and certainly not copyrightable expression—but it 
is hard to believe the defendant ever admitted that this commonality 
constitutes a high degree of similarity between the protectable expression 
of Nordstrom’s work and his own. 
The Nordstrom court rationalized its denial of the defendant’s 
request for summary judgment on a purported reluctance to deny the 
plaintiff an opportunity to cross examine the defendant on the question 
of access.290 The extraordinarily remote possibility of access, however, 
along with the complete absence of meaningful musical similarities between 
the two songs, suggests that the court was swayed by the fact that Herman’s 
song shared with Nordstrom’s significant unprotectable expression. 
Accordingly, for Jerry Herman, the expression “shalom” came to 
represent not the “nicest greeting you know,” but rather an unexpected 
fillip by which an obscure fellow musician convinced a court to entertain 
a meritless claim against him.291 
A more recent example of the unfortunate consequences of courts’ 
hesitancy to award summary judgment in music infringement disputes 
can be found in BMS Entertainment v. Bridges.292 Two words, “like that,” 
were the only common expression between the two rap songs in this 
dispute. The defendant, rap singer Chris “Ludacris” Bridges, sought 
summary judgment, arguing that even if his use of “like that” had been 
inspired by plaintiff’s song, the words were not copyrightable expression 
and therefore not a legitimate basis for an infringement claim.293 
The court denied summary judgment, citing precedent establishing 
that even “unoriginal elements, when combined, may constitute an original, 
copyrightable work.”294 The plaintiff deployed the expression “like that” 
in a repetitive call-and-response style that the defendant also used.295 It is 
 
 290. See Nordstrom, 251 F. Supp. at 43. 
 291. Jerry Herman’s “Shalom” opens with the line: “Shalom, Shalom, You’ll find Shalom the nicest 
greeting you know.” See Nordstrom v. R.C.A., supra note 287 (presenting sheet music and audio recording 
of Herman’s number). 
 292. BMS Entm’t/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, 2005 No. 04 Civ. 2584 (PKC), 2005 WL 1593013 
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005). For relevant portions of sound recordings of both works, see BMS Entertainment 
v. Bridges, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/2000-2009/Pages/ 
bmsbridges.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 293. See BMS Entm’t/Heat Music, 2005 WL 1593013, at *2. 
 294. Id. at *9 (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 295. The plaintiff’s expert report claimed that the musical setting of “like that” was similar in both songs; 
there were no pitches specified for these spoken words but in both the three syllables of “straight like that” 
and “just like that” were spoken to the same rhythm of an eighth note followed by a quarter note, followed 
by a eighth note. Id. at *3. In fact, in the sound recordings of both songs—the only medium in which they 
were distributed—the rhythm of the utterances of these expressions comports with that of how these short 
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possible, the court reasoned, that a jury might find that non-protectable 
words used in this non-protectable manner could result in a copyrightable 
“total concept and feel.”296 The case ultimately went before a jury that 
did not find this to be so.297 
The court’s decision not to decide whether the dispute involved 
legitimate copyrightable expression at the summary judgment stage was 
based on shaky ground given that every copyrightable work—and non-
copyrightable work—is a combination of unoriginal elements. Because 
all expressive works are, ultimately, combinations of “unoriginal elements,” 
techniques, and styles, the quotient of original expression resulting from 
such combinations can range from nil to highly inventive, with attendant 
copyright protection similarly ranging from nil, to “thin,” to “thick.” 
The fact that an author may have combined elements of non-
protectable expression does not lead to any presumption of likelihood 
that the resulting work is original expression.298 In BMS Entertainment, 
two of the combined elements in question—call-and-response and 
repetition—are not even expression per se. They are, rather, techniques 
by which authors convey original expression through words, notes, colors, 
and so on. The court framed its decision not to determine whether the 
application of a commonplace technique to two spoken words constituted 
protectable expression as one of judicial restraint.299 The consequences of 
such diffidence, however, were an additional two years of acrimonious 
litigation; over one hundred additional docket entries; and a punitive 
attorney fee award of hundreds of thousands of dollars against the 
plaintiff after a jury found no infringement.300 
While a denial of summary judgment is not dispositive on the 
question of infringement, as a practical matter, it is commonly the end of 
litigation in a music infringement dispute. Rather than appeal the denial, 
or prepare for a trial, the defendant will cut financial losses through 
settlement rather than spend more money to try a case. Defendants—
commonly music publishers and large media companies—realize that 
even if they ultimately obtain a favorable judgment at trial, the possibility 
of recouping any attorney fees from typically impecunious plaintiffs is 
slim. Plaintiffs and their counsel—often solo practitioners with scant 
 
phrases are typically spoken: two eighth notes followed by a quarter note. See BMS Entertainment v. 
Bridges, supra note 292. 
 296. BMS Entm’t/Heat Music, 2005 WL 1593013, at *3 (citing Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1004). 
 297. See generally id. 
 298. Musical “mash-ups,” for example, merit no copyright protection. 
 299. The reluctance of the court to rule on this question likely stemmed in part from its realization 
that recent case precedent from the same court involving nearly identical facts to those of BMS 
Entertainment were utterly inconsistent on granting defendants’ requests for summary judgment in 
such disputes. See BMS Entm’t/Heat Music, 2005 WL 1593013, at *4 (citing Santrayll v. Burrell, No. 91-
CIV.3166, 1996 WL 134803, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996); Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4022, 
2002 WL 287786 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002)). 
 300. See BMS Entertainment, 2005 WL 1593013. 
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knowledge of copyright law representing the plaintiff on a contingency 
fee basis—welcome this outcome.301 They also welcome the fact that 
should the plaintiff prevail at trial, he may elect an award of statutory 
damages.302 These range between $750 and $30,000, as “the court considers 
just,” per work found to have been infringed, with no requirement that 
the plaintiff produce evidence of having incurred actual or potential 
damages.303 
Financial settlements in response to courts’ denying motions for 
summary judgment spare courts the cost of trying the cases at hand. They 
also, however, ultimately increase their burden by encouraging others to 
make typically meritless assertions of infringement hoping to score a 
financial jackpot from courts’ improvident deference on the question of 
music similarity. The popular music industry has responded to this 
treacherous legal landscape by establishing policies shunning unsolicited 
submissions from those outside its stable of musicians under contract and 
by vetting all new releases of music recordings, film sound tracks, 
advertisements, ring tones, and so on for susceptibility to infringement 
claims.304 
B. What Should Be Done? 
Much has been written about the peculiar challenges attending 
music copyright infringement disputes, and particularly the inequitable 
consequences of the application of well-established common law tests for 
determining liability.305 Recommendations for courts to develop a more 
liberal approach to purported illicit copying among musicians are typically 
premised on either: (1) the argument that from time immemorial, musicians 
have created innovative works that appropriate significant original musical 
expression from the works of contemporaries as well as predecessors, 
and the vibrant results of this appropriation have shown this to be a 
necessary and desirable phenomenon;306 or (2) the claim that musical 
works fundamentally differ from other works of expression such that the 
standard copyright infringement tests—operating reasonably effectively 
in the case of literary and graphical works—cannot be applied to them.307 
 
 301. See Michael Harrington, Singing All the Way to Court: Charges of Plagiarism Rock the Music 
World, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1980, at K1. 
 302. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2015). 
 303. Id. § 504(c)(1). 
 304. See Michael Harrington, Going on the Record, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1984, at C5; Robert 
Palmer, The Pop Life, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1983, at C14. 
 305. Aaron Keyt offers an excellent discussion of these issues. See generally Keyt, supra note 221. 
 306. See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back 
in Copyright 91 (2011). 
 307. See, e.g., Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining 
Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 227 (2013). 
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1. A More Permissive Approach? 
Around 1730, Johann Sebastian Bach wrote an arrangement of 
Antonio Vivaldi’s Concerto for Four Violins.308 Bach changed the key of 
the concerto from B minor to A minor, and the four featured instruments 
from violins to harpsichords. More importantly, he enriched Vivaldi’s 
score with melodic elaborations and harmonic colorations.309 Bach first 
performed the concerto with his sons at Zimmerman’s Coffee House in 
Leipzig. Neither Bach nor Zimmerman charged for the performance, 
although Zimmerman benefited from increased coffee sales.310 
Both the Vivaldi concerto and Bach’s arrangement of it are frequently 
performed today. While the popularity of Bach’s concerto has arguably 
undermined the market for Vivaldi’s original work, it is just as likely that 
the market for Vivaldi’s concerto has been enhanced through association 
with the work of a musician of much greater renown. 
Regardless whether Bach’s ministrations improved the fortunes of 
Vivaldi’s concerto, they would constitute a flagrant infringement of 
Vivaldi’s work under current judicial interpretation of the U.S. Copyright 
Act. Is this a regrettable development, evidence of a contracting public 
domain? Many believe that the ability to freely appropriate others’ 
expression is essential to musical innovation: “Bach did it, Beethoven did 
it, every blues musician has done it, and jazz depends upon it.”311 Indeed, 
current copyright law applied to jazz and other improvisatory genres has 
led to the absurdity of requiring improvising performers to pay royalties 
to the authors of the “standards” on which they riff.312 But should authors 
today tolerate others “repurposing” entire works, something Bach and 
Beethoven resorted to in drafting their arrangements and variations? 
Imagine that John Williams arranged Stephen Schwartz’s Broadway 
musical Wicked in full orchestral score, to be used in a feature film 
distributed by Universal Pictures. Even the hardest-bitten copyright 
minimalist is unlikely to take the position that Williams and Universal 
should be allowed to capitalize upon someone else’s work without 
authorization and compensation—yet in the early 1730s that is what 
 
 308. Bach, Concerto for Four Harpsichords, BWV 1065; Vivaldi, Concerto for Four Violins, 
Op. 3, No. 10. 
 309. See Christoph Wolff & Walter Emery, Johann Sebastian Bach § 18 (Orchestral Music), Grove Music 
Online, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40023pg10 (last visited June 9, 2015) 
(discussing how Bach’s additions made this and similar rewritings new works in their own right). 
 310.  “From 1720 until his death in 1741 Gottfried Zimmermann ran a café and readily offered it as 
a performance space for musical ensembles in town. Audiences paid no admission fee but they bought 
coffee.” Iso Camartin, Bin ich Europäer?: Eine Tauglichkeitsprüfung 75 (2006). 
 311. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 306, at 91. 
 312. See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright and That Ain’t Good, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1940, 1958 (2005). In 
the early 1940s, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers embarked upon a campaign to 
identify swing musicians who incorporated snippets of popular songs’ melodies in their improvisations, and 
demanded royalties for their doing so. See Starr & Waterman, supra note 63, at 139. 
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Bach and Zimmerman’s Coffee House did shamelessly with respect to 
Vivaldi’s concerto; autres temps, autres moeurs? 
There was no copyright law in the German states in the early 
eighteenth century and Bach had no legal obligation to Vivaldi.313 Nor 
did Bach have any ethical obligation to him, given the technology and 
economics of music distribution in his day.314 Very little music was 
published then, and neither Bach nor Vivaldi earned their livelihoods from 
sales of copies or from public performances of their works; rather, their 
livelihoods derived from the government or the church. Music rarely 
circulated beyond the court, church, or city for which it was written and 
arrangements, like Bach’s of Vivaldi’s concerto, spread the music and 
renown of composers from elsewhere.315 
Prior to market saturation by sound recording technology in the 
twentieth century, operas and symphonic works were disseminated not only 
in full and reduced scores but even more broadly through arrangements 
of, and improvisations upon, these works performed by church organists, 
virtuoso pianists like Liszt and Chopin, and a great variety of automata 
like barrel organs and music boxes.316 
It would never have occurred to Liszt to seek Bellini or Verdi’s 
authorization to publish and perform the works he derived from their 
operas. Nor would Bellini or even Verdi, who was known for his financial 
canniness, have considered demanding royalties from Liszt for capitalizing 
 
 313. See generally Hansjörg Pohlmann, Die Fruhgeschichte des Musikalischen Urheberrechts 
(1962) (noting that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the many feudal duchies comprising today’s 
German Republic made it impossible to establish a uniform national copyright system like that of England 
at that time). 
 314. See Scherer, supra note 82, at 88. 
 315. This is particularly true when the author of the arrangement accords appropriate credit to the 
earlier author, as Bach did in this case. Bach’s Concerto for Four Harpsichords is generally referred to as 
his “Concerto nach Vivaldi,” which translates to “Concerto after (in fact, musically and chronologically) 
Vivaldi’s.” Bach’s contemporary, G.F. Handel, on the other hand, capitalized upon the fact that little 
music was published in his day by incorporating into his works significant portions of music that he lifted 
from the manuscripts of composers little known to his audiences. Handel never credited the composers 
whose music he appropriated; his “borrowings” have been identified over many years by musicologists. 
See generally Sedley Taylor, The Indebtedness of Handel to Works by Other Composers: A 
Presentation of Evidence (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1971) (1906) (comparing various works of Handel to 
those of other composers). When Handel was once confronted with an instance of his plagiarism he is 
said to have responded: “That pig doesn’t know what to do with such a tune.” See Arthur Elson, The 
Book of Musical Knowledge 80 (1915). 
 316. In Luchino Visconti’s film adaptation of Giuseppe Lampedusa’s novel Il Gattopardo [The 
Leopard], upon arrival at their country seat in the Sicilian mountains, the exhausted aristocratic family 
immediately gives thanks to God for their safe arrival at the local church where the organist improvises 
on themes from Verdi’s La Traviata (1853). (Verdi’s opera retells the tragic story of Alexandre Dumas’ 
novel La Dame aux Camélias about the disease and untimely death of a prostitute.) French composer 
Camille Saint-Saëns was an organist at Paris’s La Madeleine in the 1860s and 70s and attendees at 
Mass often requested that he improvise upon melodies heard the night before at the Opéra that is in the 
same neighborhood as the church. See Janette Fishell, Organ Recital at the First Congregational 
Church, Los Angeles, Program Notes: A Tale of Three Cities (copy on file with Author). 
H - CRONIN_21 (ONLINE) 6/22/2015 9:50 PM 
June 2015]      I HEAR AMERICA SUING 1247 
upon their works. Both opera composers realized that Liszt’s derivative 
works indicated the high quality of their operas. Audiences hearing 
Reminiscences of Norma or Concert Paraphrase on Rigoletto would be 
predisposed to attend performances of these and other new operas by 
the same composers; Liszt’s borrowing was a valuable endorsement of 
their music, which promoted their economic interests and reputations.317 
While Bach’s enhancement of Vivaldi’s concerto may have generated 
greater interest in Vivaldi’s concerto than it might otherwise have 
enjoyed, it may also have undermined enthusiasm for the earlier work. 
The Vivaldi/Bach concertos, however, are anomalously fungible works; 
Liszt’s arrangements for piano of Bellini operas and Beethoven symphonies 
are not. An audience at the concert today would take in stride learning at 
the concert hall that the Bach concerto had been substituted for the 
Vivaldi on the program it is about to hear. The same audience would be 
mutinous, however, to learn that a performance of a Liszt piano 
transcription had been substituted for a performance of an opera by 
Verdi or a symphony by Beethoven. 
Today, a reworking that hews as closely as Bach’s to the music of an 
existing work would be rightly considered infringing. This is because the 
economics of music creation and distribution have changed significantly 
over the past 250 years. Under the circumstances and expectations in 
which Bach created and performed his work, Vivaldi suffered no financial 
harm, despite the fact that Bach’s work was virtually interchangeable 
with his. 
On the other hand, the unauthorized score by John Williams we 
imagined a moment ago, that is similarly interchangeable with Stephen 
Schwartz’s, would seriously compromise Schwartz’s economic interests in 
Wicked, and film-related revenues particularly. This is because technology 
has eradicated the constraints of Bach’s era on the reproduction and 
distribution of musical works. Apart from a few locals in Zimmerman’s 
Coffee House who heard Bach perform his Concerto after Vivaldi, no 
one was even aware of the work’s existence as it was not published or 
performed again until well into the nineteenth century.318 John Williams’ 
film adaptation of Schwartz’s Wicked, however, would be heard by millions 
throughout the world within days of Universal’s release of the film. 
To summarize, the argument that history demonstrates the desirability 
of a more liberal approach to musical appropriation needs to be more 
nuanced. Liszt’s piano paraphrases of operatic and symphonic works are 
so transformative of the works on which they were based that they 
 
 317. Réminiscences de Norma (1841); Paraphrase de Concert sur Rigoletto (1859). Popular works 
by Liszt were also freely arranged by others like Jules de Swert, who created a cello version of Liszt’s six 
Consolations (originally for solo piano). 
 318. The Bach concerto was not published until 1865. See International Music Score Library Project, 
http://www.imslp.org (last visited June 9, 2015). 
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complemented rather than competed with them—much the way jazz 
operates today.319 On the other hand, an elaboration upon another’s 
complete work, and in the same musical genre, while harmless 250 years 
ago, would unfairly compromise the financial interests of the first author 
today.320 
2. A Sui Generis Infringement Test for Music? 
Do musical works differ from other forms of human expression such 
that the existing infringement test for copying and substantial similarity 
cannot meaningfully be applied to them? Increasingly, those advocating 
for a revised test for evaluating music copyright infringement claims are 
making this argument.321 As recently suggested, claims involving musical 
works should be adjudicated using a higher standard of similarity than that 
used for other works of expression because it is very difficult to create an 
original musical work given the limited parameters of music (melody, 
harmony, and rhythm).322 Moreover, “music is the only type of creative 
work that appeals primarily to the ear rather than the eye.”323 
 
 319. In 1829, German and Austrian music publishers, in the absence of any national copyright 
legislation, ratified an anti-piracy agreement among themselves (essentially a cartel) that nicely balanced 
the financial interests of authors of original melodic material and others who capitalize upon it. Article 
5 of the agreement established that “[m]elody is recognized as the exclusive property of the publisher 
and every arrangement that reproduces it that is based only on mechanical processing” constitutes a 
violation of the agreement. However, “variations, fantasies . . . based upon melodies of others, which 
themselves require mental activity and creative talent should be considered autonomous works,” and 
in questionable cases a committee will decide the matter. See Max Schumann, Zur Geschichte des 
Deutschen Musikalienhandels Seit der Gründung des Vereins der Deutschen Musikalienhändler: 
1829–1929, at 17 (1929) (author’s translation). The appeal and distribution of musical works were less 
limited by national boundaries than those of literary works; hence, the music publishers were at the 
forefront of the development of statutory copyright in Germany. See id. at 37; see also F. M. Scherer, 
The Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe From 1709 to 1850, at 8 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. 
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Paper No. RWP08-052, 2008). 
 320. One of the few copyright infringement disputes in which this was the case is Baron v. Leo 
Feist, 78 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In Baron, the music of defendant’s “Rum and Coca Cola”—a 
hit recorded by the Andrews Sisters—was copied entirely from plaintiff’s little-known calypso song. 
For sound recordings and sheet music of both works, see Baron v. Leo Feist, Univ. S. Cal. Music Copyright 
Infringement Res., http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1940-1949/Pages/baronfeist.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
 321. See, e.g., Keyt, supra note 221, at 443–44 (arguing that abstract tests for infringement should be 
replaced with consideration of market damage and apportionment of each composer’s creative contribution 
to a work). 
 322. See Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 307, at 291. 
 323. Id. Livingston and Urbinato appear to have misread Judge Frank’s facetious remark in his 
Arnstein v. Porter opinion about the improbability of Ravel or Shostakovich borrowing the melody of 
“When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.” The authors argue—as Frank clearly implies: 
It is highly unlikely that composers of such high stature as Ravel and Shostakovich would 
appropriate ‘When Irish Eyes Are Smiling’ . . . . Why would Ravel, a French/Spanish composer, 
reference or even want to reference an Irish tune . . . . Why would Shostakovich, a Russian 
composer . . . reference an Irish tune . . . .  
Id. at 260 n.4. In fact, serious music is rife with instances of such unexpected musical juxtapositions, 
such as Brahms’ incorporating the melody of “Battle Hymn of the Republic” into the first movement 
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The latter argument correctly implies that because our sense of hearing 
is less acute than sight, we are more sensitive in discerning similarities 
and differences between works perceived visually than aurally. But this 
argument is flawed in two respects: music is not the only authorial 
expression we experience primarily through hearing; and it does not 
distinguish between the perceptions of sound versus that of music. 
Imagine that you are at a gym, on a treadmill mercifully equipped 
with a television screen—but you forgot to bring headphones! Sitcoms 
and reality shows—tempting but soundless—are out of the question and 
you must, reluctantly, resort to CNN with its text ribbon corresponding 
to the spoken words. Suppose instead that you brought your headphones 
but only the aural component of the television was working. You may be 
less stimulated without images accompanying the sound, but you will 
perceive more accurately the essential information conveyed in virtually 
everything being broadcast: the sitcom, reality show, news program—not 
to mention the PBS performance of Shakespeare—than you would if you 
only saw moving images. Apart perhaps from mime and dance, most works 
of the performing arts are perceived as much—if not more—through the 
ear than the eye.324 
Purely graphical representations—that is, scores—on the other hand, 
remain the primary media by which musicians and musicologists perceive 
serious music. Like actors studying their parts, conductors, singers, 
pianists, and so on will silently read their scores repeatedly to understand 
them, internalize them, and commit them to memory.325 Beethoven did 
not conceive or perceive his Ninth Symphony, or late string quartets, 
through his hearing—he was deaf when he wrote them; these works exist 
 
of his Piano Concerto in B-flat (1881); von Flotow’s incorporating the entire “Tis the Last Rose of 
Summer” in his opera Martha (1847); Tchaikovsky’s use of Wagner’s “swan motif” from Lohengrin 
(1850) in his ballet Swan Lake (1876); and the exquisitely incongruous use of the tune of “Home 
Sweet Home” in the aria sung by Donizetti’s tragic heroine while incarcerated in the Tower of London 
in his opera Anna Bolena (1830). 
  “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” is not an “Irish tune”—it was written by American songwriter 
Ernest Ball in 1912 for American audiences. The song was the subject of a dispute over a question about 
the validity of an assignment of copyright renewal rights. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & 
Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit opinion by Judge Clark, from 
which Judge Frank dissented. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942). 
The reverse of judicial antipathy between Clark and Frank would reemerge several years later in Arnstein 
v. Porter, and the earlier case was undoubtedly the inspiration for Frank’s reference to “When Irish Eyes 
Are Smiling” in the latter. 
 324. Even dance might be said to rely more on hearing than sight. We often listen to entire ballets (that 
is, performances of the music score) and conjure images of our favorite performers. To the extent dancers 
are capable of performing without music, watching them do so soon becomes tedious. 
 325. Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain 31 (2007) (“[My father] always 
had two or three miniature orchestral scores stuffed in his pockets, and between seeing patients he might pull 
out a score and have a little internal concert. He did not need to put a record on the gramophone, for he 
could play a score almost as vividly in his mind, perhaps with different moods or interpretations, and 
sometimes improvisations of his own.”). 
H - CRONIN_21 (ONLINE) 6/22/2015 9:50 PM 
1250 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1187 
thanks to Beethoven’s sight and intellect.326 Popular music today, on the 
other hand, is not written or read by anyone. Its creators/performers are 
mostly incapable of creating a visual record of their musical expression 
that, in turn, tends to be so rudimentary that there is no need to resort to 
a medium whose purpose is to record complex works. 
The vocabulary of music is as large as—if not larger than—those of 
visual or literary works; and a literate musician today can create original 
musical expression as readily as a novelist or poet. What has diminished 
is not the potential to create original musical works, but rather the 
appreciation of them. In fact, the more original a work the less likely it 
will be valued, let alone tolerated, by lay audiences. Like the late prose 
works of Joyce, the music of twentieth century musicians like Elliott 
Carter and Milton Babbitt is highly original and enjoys, therefore, 
“deep” copyright protection. Paradoxically, there is little need for this 
protection given that the economic value of their music, like that of 
Finnegan’s Wake, is almost nugatory because of its originality. 
C. Recapitulation 
Since the Tin Pan Alley era and the establishment of the American 
popular music industry early in the twentieth century, courts have handled 
a continually growing number of infringement disputes based upon 
allegations of musical similarities. This is noteworthy because, since the 
middle of the century, the appeal and economic value of popular songs 
have become increasingly determined by sounds, words, imagery, and 
particular performances, rather than music. 
The origins of this increased judicial burden, and the uneasiness it 
has produced within the music industry, can be traced to the courts 
themselves. To accommodate Arnstein’s directive to defer to lay listeners 
in determining substantial similarity of protected expression, courts have 
been reluctant to grant summary judgment to defendants in music 
copyright infringement disputes. This restraint, in turn, has fostered an 
ethos of misguided opportunism resulting in absurdly speculative claims 
like those discussed in the Introduction.327 
Courts could alleviate this problem by revamping established summary 
judgment and infringement standards. But this approach is utterly 
improbable and undesirable given that these standards, developed and 
 
 326. Early Mozart Works Discovered: Two Keyboard Pieces by the 8-Year-Old Composer Found in 
Salzburg, Classicalmusic.com (Aug. 3, 2009, 12:41 PM), http://www.classical-music.com/news/early-
mozart-works-discovered (“An anecdote recounted by a family friend soon after Mozart’s death, 
describe[s] how Leopold . . . [when] examining some blotchy, untidy sketches of an early concerto 
movement written by his 7 or 8-year old son . . . began to observe . . . the notes and music . . . . He 
stared long at the sheet, and then tears, tears of joy and wonder, fell from his eyes.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 327. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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tested over decades of litigation, for the most part, promote equitable 
outcomes.328 Courts could, however, more readily award summary 
judgment in music infringement cases than they have done in recent 
years, or simply dismiss them, if they were to acknowledge the significance 
of the fact that popular music—to a greater degree than other forms of 
protected expression—is profoundly different than that of the era in 
which Arnstein promulgated its framework for determining infringement 
and its exceedingly restrained approach to summary judgment. 
Virtually all copyrightable works of expression are now created using 
tools and techniques different from those used in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Despite the fact that novelists, graphic designers, 
screen writers, and so on use different technologies to record their 
expression, they still employ the words, symbols, lines, and colors used 
by these authors since time immemorial. This is not true of contemporary 
popular songwriters/performers. Dramatic works are mainly perceived 
audibly, but no author creates, records, and distributes a dramatic work 
using audio technology; even if he were to dictate portions of it, he would 
ultimately work primarily with a visible verbal text. The music of popular 
songs, however, that was created, recorded, and distributed using symbolic 
notation in the first half of the twentieth century, is now created, 
recorded, distributed, and consumed, only as aural information. 
Like popular music, dramatic, prose, and poetic works could be 
created and recorded exclusively as audible information. But novelists, 
playwrights, and poets create and record their works using visible symbols 
because they permit them to manipulate and control the creation of more 
complex works of personal expression than they could create using only 
recorded sounds.329 Without the ability to work with visible music 
notation that similarly allows for the creation of complex and original 
works, songwriters will tend to produce musically derivative and simple 
songs warranting minimal copyright protection. 
In the 1940s, when Arnstein was decided, the popularity and 
economic value of a song were determined by a blend of the quality of 
the music and the appeal of a particular performance of it. This is also 
true of popular songs today. In the 1940s, however, the song’s writer was 
not also its performer, and the economic value of a song was not 
inextricably tied to a particular singer. Two recordings of a song by Cole 
Porter might be equally appealing despite the fact that they are by 
singers differing in age, sex, race, and voice type. 
Since the 1950s, the economic value of popular songs has depended 
increasingly on the appeal of performances by the work’s putative author. 
 
 328. See Dalton & Cable, supra note 21, at 26. 
 329. Use of visible symbols to record these works also enables deeper and more personal enjoyment 
of them. We often find disappointing film adaptations of favorite novels, for instance, because they do 
not meet the richly textured visualizations of these works that our imaginations yield from reading. 
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There are dozens of economically valuable recordings of Gershwin songs, 
none of which feature George or Ira Gershwin. But there are few saleable 
recordings of songs by the Beatles or the Rolling Stones other than those 
by the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, and none whatever for a rap 
number by Kanye West other than his own. 
Recordings of popular songs today are nonfungible, reflecting the 
fact that the economic value of songs in rock and rap genres depends 
overwhelmingly on the sounds and imagery of the songwriter/performer 
rather than the underlying musical work.330 Accordingly, the economic 
interests of the copyright owners of songs in these genres can be 
undermined only by unauthorized copying of substantial—if not entire—
portions of both the songwriter’s work and his performance of it. 
This shift in value of popular songs from music to sounds and images 
corresponds to a gradual drift away from melodic primacy in popular 
music. In 1936, Judge Learned Hand observed that, although it is difficult 
to predict the success of a popular song: “it is the [melodic] themes which 
catch the popular fancy” and are, therefore, the proper focus of inquiry 
in an infringement dispute.331 Learned Hand’s observation, however, is 
no longer applicable to popular music, particularly rock, rap, and techno 
numbers that contain little melodic material. The diminishment of melody 
in these genres reflects not only a rebalancing of musical parameters to 
emphasize repetitive rhythmic and harmonic patterns, but also the 
remarkable gender segregation associated with the creation and 
performance of popular music since the 1960s.332 
Tin Pan Alley songwriters were overwhelmingly men, but their 
songs were sung and performed at least as often by women as by men.333 
The appeal of rock and rap songs, on the other hand, is yoked to the 
gender and race of the songwriter/performers.334 Songwriter/performer 
 
 330. This is not to suggest that particular performers and imagery associated with them did not 
play a significant role in marketing popular music in the first half of the twentieth century as well. Referring 
to the music publisher Charles Harris, David Suisman notes that he “helped lay the foundation for the 
system of promotion of popular songs around the country. For the publisher, printing a picture of a well-
known performer on the cover of the sheet music took advantage of the performer’s existing popularity.” 
Suisman, supra note 24, at 31. 
 331. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 332. See Joan Serra et al., Measuring the Evolution of Contemporary Western Popular Music, 2 Sci. 
Reps. No. 521, at 1 (2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00521 (claiming that application of 
music information processing technologies has demonstrated: a narrowing of melodic diversity; 
homogenization of the timbral palatte; and increasingly loudness levels in popular music between 
1950–2000); see also Sean Michaels, Pop Music These Days: It All Sounds the Same, Survey Reveals, 
Guardian (July 27, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/jul/27/pop-music-sounds-
same-survey-reveals (summarizing report.). 
 333. See Suisman, supra note 24, at 22; supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 334. The mostly meritocratic world of serious music performers is now vastly more integrated by 
race and gender than that of popular music. “Rock’s social consequences are incidental to and often 
contradictory of its avowed racial integration. There are more blacks at a Republican convention than 
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rock and rap groups are overwhelmingly comprised of men, and their 
songs and performances tend to project a grotesquely exaggerated 
adherence to male heterosexuality in efforts to counter, on behalf of their 
profitable audience of young men, homosexual anxiety evoked from its 
enjoyment of entertainment by “all male” casts “padding their crotches 
or highlighting their endowments.”335 Melody, the most worrisome 
feminine musical attribute—particularly when sung—is sparingly used in 
rock and rap music.336 Long-spun melodic themes are relegated to women 
singing “ballads,” or country/western crooners whose songs still reflect 
lyrical elements of their folk progenitors.337 
With the diminished significance of melody in a number of popular 
genres, rhythm and—above all—sound became increasingly vital 
determinants of the appeal of numbers in genres like rock, rap, disco, 
and techno. Unlike melody, however, rhythm, sound, and structure in 
popular songs are not viable bases for music copyright protection. While 
the choice of particular rhythms and sounds—like that of harmonies and 
timbres—may involve “sweat of the brow,” there are too few rhythmic 
 
at a Van Halen concert, and the music industry keeps its statistics on records sales separate but equal.” 
Pattison, supra note 159, at 63. 
 335. Id. at 114. Pattison observes that “for all its pansexuality, rock is largely about men . . . . Rock 
celebrates pastoral and primitive utopias while swathing its stars in polyester jockstraps and arming itself 
with the latest devices of electronic technology.” Id. at 119, 126. Further, to abate homoerotic frisson 
among their male fans, rock and rap performers resort to preposterously misogynist lyrics simultaneously 
belittling and objectifying women. For example, the song Girls, by The Beastie Boys, contains the 
following lyrics: “Girls, to do the dishes; Girls, to clean up my room; Girls, to do the laundry; Girls, 
and in the bathroom.”  
  When a toy manufacturer released a parody of this song mocking its deliberately reactionary 
message, the Beastie Boys sued for copyright infringement claiming the band never authorized use of 
their songs in advertising. See GoldieBlox, Inc. v. Island Def Jam Music Group, No. 5:13-cv-05428 
(N.D. Cal., 2013); see also Dave Itzkoff, Beastie Boys Fight Online Video Parody of ‘Girls’, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 25, 2013, at C3. 
 336. Electric amplification is another component of rock and rap’s pseudo-masculinity. “Loud 
music in a public place is a way of swaggering—macho, aggressive. It’s hardly ever women students 
who play loud music out their windows.” Phyllis Rose, Hers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1984, at C2. 
Similarly, Allan Bloom observed that “[s]ome of [rock music’s] power comes from the fact that it is so 
loud. It makes conversation impossible, so that much of friendship must be without the shared speech 
that Aristotle asserts is the essence of friendship and the only true common ground.” Allan Bloom, 
The Closing of the American Mind 75 (1987). 
 337. In a twist on an expression of insane male insecurity, “real men don’t sing”; singing involves melody 
that involves higher pitches than the accompaniment in popular songs. High pitches are associated with 
voices of women and children; melodies that employ them may be decorated and “flowery” as suggested by 
the Italian “fioratura” used to describe embellished vocal lines, particularly those sung by sopranos. Melody 
is also the most memorable and replicable musical component of popular songs. One finds evidence of its 
diminished role in popular music today even in this writer’s observation that white and black laborers rarely, 
any longer, whistle, hum, or sing while working—they have little to work from, and machines do their 
“singing” for them—while their Latin American counterparts still sing and whistle popular songs from 
Central America that never abandoned their melodic base. Terada Honke, a brewer of superb sake near 
Tokyo emphasizes the importance of its employees’ singing while laboring to maintain the high quality of its 
product. The Natural Organic Japanese Sake Brewery, Terada Honke, http://www.teradahonke.co.jp/ 
english.htm (last visited June 9, 2015). 
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and harmonic combinations, or rhythmic patterns, that are perceptible 
and appealing to popular music audiences, to permit the monopolization 
of any one of them. 
Conclusion 
Only the federal judiciary might abate the recent “plethora of 
copyright disputes and litigation” involving popular songs, and avert 
distorted verdicts in these disputes—like that of Selle v. Gibb.338 Courts 
could further this goal by readily dismissing disputes, or by granting 
defendants summary judgment, based on a more informed understanding 
of the means by which the contested works were created than that 
generally evinced in judicial opinions in these cases in recent decades. 
Given the transformation of popular music during this time—and 
the significant narrowing of copyrightable expression entailed—it is not 
unreasonable to assert that courts would have been justified in granting 
defendants summary judgment in practically every litigated claim of music 
copyright infringement over the past half century. With an appreciation 
of how popular music is now produced, a comparison of the genuinely 
musical elements of disputed works would, in virtually every instance, 
lead to the conclusion that there is “no genuine issue of material fact” on 
the question of substantial similarity of protected musical expression. 
The diffuse and ambiguous authorship of most popular music today 
harkens back to that of American songs of labor, patriotism, piety, 
homesickness, and so on, from before the Tin Pan Alley era and the 
insidious development of a music “industry.” This is not a characterization 
that the recording industry acknowledges because it challenges its cultivated 
fallacy that today’s popular performers are exponents of the Tin Pan Alley 
tunesmith tradition. American popular music now implicates commercial 
stakes entirely absent from popular music in early America. This enormous 
growth in economic value, however, has not been generated by a 
commensurate development in original musical expression that can be 
specifically attributed to a particular author or authors. 
Popular songs today are akin to Lego block or Tinker Toy assemblages 
in which the constituent components may contain greater inventiveness 
than their combination. Or, the finger paintings of toddlers whose doting 
parents—like music arrangers, audio engineers, and videographers—will 
transform them into attractive works by using skillful framing and 
presentation techniques unknown to their creators. Regardless of the 
potential appeal or marketability of such creations, however, the more 
nebulous their authorship, the more charily courts should view the 
legitimacy of infringement claims based upon them. 
 
 338. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Copyright’s objective is to promote the creation of new works by 
protecting the economic potential of original expression. The economic 
potential of most popular music today is mainly determined by non-musical 
elements like performance style, personal appearance, and engineered 
sound—none of which is protected by copyright. Accordingly, most 
popular music should be accorded shallow protection compared to that 
provided works written before the rock ’n’ roll era. The thinner the 
protection, the heavier the plaintiff’s burden in a copyright infringement 
claim to demonstrate a defendant’s copying of his work in its entirety. 
Courts could cultivate a return to more permissible attitudes toward 
copying of musical expression through less hospitable reception of 
infringement disputes involving anything other than replication of 
substantial musical expression—essentially the entire work—that threatens 
to supplant it in the marketplace. Doing so might not initiate a second 
golden age of American popular song, but it likely would curtail the 
growing number of spurious infringement claims, and also reestablish the 
fundamental objectives of providing copyright to musical works that our 
forebears appear to have understood better than we.  
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